10-13-14; Good News for IL WC--Bad Economic News for IL Gov't; New IWCC 'Rule' with analysis by Jim Egan; Rules of Evidence in IL WC by Lindsay Vanderford and much more

Synopsis: Good News for the IL WC Industry and Bad News for the Illinois Economic Climate.

 

Editor’s comment: As we advised our readers, the goofy WC “advisory rates” as a measure of workers’ comp costs are a very poor metric by which to measure the success or failure of our state’s workers’ comp system. In our experience, every year WC advisory rates drop. The problem with advisory rates is they are illusory—there is no requirement an Illinois WC insurance carrier adhere to them at all. In fact, when IL WC skyrocketed under convicted former Governor Blagojevich, WC advisory rates still went down.

 

In our view, the much better metric by which to evaluate the success or progress of IL WC reforms is the State of Oregon WC Premium Rate Ranking. This study is published on an every-other-year basis and the stat-rats in Oregon do a very solid job of evaluating and measuring what U.S. Business needs to know. They study and report how actual WC insurance premiums change for better or worse.

 

The 2014 Oregon Report is online: http://www.cbs.state.or.us/external/dir/wc_cost/files/report_summary.pdf

 

If you take a look, you will note Illinois has gone from 4th highest in 2012 to 7th highest on January 1, 2014. We consider that a solid improvement and is pointing our system in the right direction. The WC insurance premium rate indices were calculated based on data from 51 jurisdictions, for insurance premium rates in effect as of Jan. 1, 2014. The 2014 median value is $1.85, which is a drop of 2 percent from the $1.88 median of the 2012 study. Illinois WC premium rate index is $2.35 per $100 of payroll, or 127% percent of the national median. National premium rate indices range from a low of $0.88 in North Dakota, to a whopping high of $3.48 in California. You may note California is more than a dollar per $100 of payroll higher than our state. There were 21 states that had an index rate that was within plus or minus 10 percent of the benchmark value. In the upper part of the WC premium rate distribution, 13 states had index rates higher than 110 percent of the median, while 17 states were below 90 percent of the median.

 

What does all this mean? Well, it means the “haircut” which the IL WC system got in 2011 is working. We also feel the reasonable and professional Arbitrators and Commissioners are following the rules, reviewing the evidence before them and doing their very best to come to the middle. Much of the cronyism of the past is gone and WC fraud is considered a problem. We salute Chairman Michael Latz and his solid staff for their hard work in bringing things down and hope he keeps working hard to continue the progress made under their administration.

 

Can it get even better? Sure, it can! We don’t feel the improvement is stopping--we think it may just be starting. We hope the IL WC PPP concept kicks into fifth gear soon and Illinois business gets even more savings for their WC dollars. We are also sure the tried and true WC cost reduction tools of thorough accident investigation, getting a signed HIPAA/GINA compliant release and comparing medical histories in questionable claims are being done by solid risk managers and adjusters. When you have WC claims you feel need to be fought, send KCB&A an email with details and we can give you a solid review of the strengths and weaknesses of any IL WC claim. With more hard work, we truly feel the current ranking at 7th highest can be moved down into the teens or mid-twenties in the next 3-5 years. We will be watching for the 2016 Oregon WC premium rankings to best judge future progress.

 

The Bad News for the IL Economy—the ALEC or American Legislative Exchange Council just issued their important economic report titled Rich States, Poor States, 2014 Edition. In their detailed and dispassionate economic analysis, they rank Illinois 48th. This report is free and you can review it or download it online at: http://www.alec.org/publications/rich-states-poor-states/

 

One problem with this report is Illinois may be in even worse shape following our current statewide election—as we have advised our readers, Illinois income taxes may get dramatically worse under IL State Democrats next month. Right now, the highest rate is supposed to drop to 3.75% at the end of the year. If current IL Governor Quinn wins, our income taxes are set to rapidly escalate to a maximum rate of 8%.

 

As gubernatorial challenger Bruce Rauner has pointed out, you can’t tax your way out of the hole created by years of bad governance, unpaid bills and multi-billion dollar deficit borrowing. For one example, the State of Maryland raised tax rates on the “wealthy” in 2007 when the politicians in Annapolis created a millionaire tax bracket, raising the top marginal income-tax rate to 6.25 percent. Since two of Maryland’s biggest counties also impose income taxes, the state-local tax rate could go as high as 9.45 percent. Maryland Gov. Martin O’Malley declared these “wealthy” 0.3 percent of state tax filers were “willing and able to pay their fair share.” Guess again.

 

The next year Maryland state auditors discovered one-third of the millionaires disappeared from Maryland tax rolls and had obviously and wisely moved away. In 2008, roughly 3,000 “wealthy” income tax returns were filed in Maryland by the end of April. The following year there were 2,000 such returns, which the state comptroller’s office conceded was a “substantial decline.” On those missing tax returns and departed “wealthy” citizens, Maryland State government collects 6.25 percent of nothing. Instead of the state coffers gaining the extra $106 million the politicians predicted, millionaires paid $100 million less in taxes than they did in the year prior—even at higher rates.

 

As you read this, Governor Quinn and House Speaker Madigan are openly fighting and pressing anyone willing to listen to raise our state income tax rates to 8%. Next month, In the November 2014 legislative veto session in Springfield, they may rise to 8% because Democrats have majorities in both houses of the legislature and may have a Democrat governor who has already indicated he will rapidly sign this giant increase in your taxes. Please also note, following the Maryland model above, it probably isn’t going to help at all. If Bruce Rauner becomes our Governor, it will be dramatically harder for IL Democrats to enact the much higher taxes, as they will have to override his veto.

 

We see no efforts or open discussion by Governor Quinn or any incumbent state official to reform our state government and stop the obvious waste and redundancy in Springfield which is causing the need for these higher levies. For the entire time Pat Quinn has been our Governor, he has been a ���deadbeat” bill payer, leaving billions of dollars of unpaid bills sitting for vendors, agencies and others to wait months or years for tax money to arrive before payments are made. The practice is so common, sadly everyone has become “used” to it and knows there is no reason to complain. Our concern remain the same—is this a solid way to run government? Is Illinois ready for reform?

 

Please note the Illinois statewide election has already started and you can vote right now—if you don’t know how, send a reply. It will end on November 4 which is just over three weeks away. We urge our readers to make your voice known and vote.

 

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Synopsis: Are New IWCC Rules Being Established for IL WC Motions to Withdraw? Analysis and comments by Jim Egan, J.D.

 

Editor’s Comment: It was recently announced at one of the downstate status calls this week IWCC Chairman Latz had enacted a new but informal rule on Petitioner attorney’s motions to withdraw as counsel for record. It was announced that no longer would a certified mail green card be enough to have a motion to withdraw granted by the Arbitrator assigned.

 

Going forward the motion would have to go on the record and the motioning attorney would need to produce evidence of a skip trace to confirm all efforts had been made to locate a missing Petitioner. If you are not aware, a “skip trace” requires the attorney to hire a detective or similar licensed provider to seek out any trace of a missing claimant. The Arbitrator advised the attorneys at the call that if there was no skip trace on record there was a risk the case could be reinstated later if the Petitioner re-appeared. Attorneys questioning the new “rule” at the call were politely advised while there was not a section in the Act nor case law confirming authority for this new rule, failure to follow this directive would be done at their own risk as this is what the Chairman wanted.

 

We note no new announcement on the IWCC’s excellent and informative website confirming this new rule and we are continuing to monitor the situation to confirm.

 

This being said, we fell the defense bar will need to be diligent going forward in following counsel’s motions to withdraw. If a skip trace is made part of the record when counsel withdraws, you will want a copy of the record or the skip trace in order to confirm same when the defense motion for hearing/dismissal is filed. If no skip trace is produced and counsel proceeds with testimony that he/she “performed their due diligence” in searching for Petitioner, the defense may, in order to protect their dismissal motion/hearing request, obtain their own skip trace of a missing Petitioner.

 

It was also announced obligatory responses to red-line matters would no longer be accepted and Form 41s would be required going forward. Veteran downstate practitioners will note that it has always been relatively easy to continue matters by informally announcing the status during the call. We were advised six months of “negotiating settlement” or “setting deps” will no longer get the job done for a red-line continuance.

 

It seems the IL WC Commission is making another attempt to crack down on the red-line, this time in the downstate venues. We are continuing to monitor other status calls to see if the same announcements are made. As always we will continue to report if this practice becomes State-wide or an announcement is made in the IWCC website.

 

This article was researched and written by James F. Egan, J.D. Jim can be reached on a 24/7/365 basis at jegan@keefe-law.com.

 

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Synopsis: WCLA CLE’s for the IL WC Industry—Modernization of the Rules of Evidence and an Appellate Ruling regarding  the Statute of Limitations as it relates to Repetitive Trauma Claims Thoughts and Analysis by Lindsay R. Vanderford, J.D.

Editor’s comment: Last week, several important rules of evidence were discussed and a recent case was discussed by WCLA experts in a continuing legal education format. Some of the key issues are discussed below. This article is focused on the Commissioners, Arbitrators and attorneys at the IWCC on both sides of the bar. For risk managers and adjusters, it is fairly technical and you might want to go on to other things.

Rules of Evidence Modernized

The most current Illinois Rules of Evidence became effective January 1, 2011. They are primarily a codification of existing common law rules of evidence with some modernization. Though similar to the Federal Rules of Evidence, there are a few unique respects which Illinois chose not to adopt. These rules govern proceedings in the courts of Illinois. (Rule 101 – Scope). Illinois common law rules of evidence apply to proceedings before the Commission, except to the extent they conflict with the Act or Commission Rules. (Comm. Rule 7030.70).

Rule of Completeness? Rule 106, Remainder of Related Writings or Recorded Statements

 

If part of writing or recorded statement is introduced into evidence, an adverse party may require any other part of a writing or recording or any other writing or recording which “ought in fairness” be considered is also admissible. Previously, only another part of same writing or recording was admissible. This applies both to substantive evidence and impeachment evidence. Mere mention of a conversation or statement (casual reference) does not require completion. Notably, this modernization will help to admit earlier records showing like complaints.

Habit or Routine Practice? Rule 406

 

Evidence of the habit of a person or the routine practice of an organization, whether corroborated or not and regardless of the presences of eyewitnesses, is relevant to prove that the conduct of the person or organization on a particular occasion was in conformity with the habit or routine practice. Previously, some cases required evidence of corroboration. The modernized rule has clearly abolished the need for corroboration. Similarly, some cases forbade habit evidence if there were eyewitnesses to an occurrence. Now, evidence is admissible even if eyewitnesses were present. An individual with personal knowledge must lay the foundation the practice was sufficiently “routine.”

Prior Inconsistent Statement ? Rule 613(a)

 

When examining a witness with a prior statement, the statement need not be shown to the witness. However, on request, the statement must be shown to opposing counsel.

Statement by an Agent ? Rule 801(d)(2)(D)

A statement is not hearsay if the statement is a statement by the party’s agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment. The statement does not need to be against the interest of the declarant. An admission of a party is substantive evidence (not just for credibility/impeachment). The declarant need not hold a position of authority in the company and need not be authorized to speak on behalf of the company. The statement just has to concern a matter within the scope of employment during such employment.

Statements for Purpose of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment ? Rule 803(b)(4)

“Statements made for purposes of medical treatment, or medical diagnosis in contemplation of treatment, and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment but, subject to Rule 703, not including statements made to a health care provider consulted solely for purpose of preparing for litigation or obtaining testimony for trial.” This exception does not apply to an examining physician seen solely for purpose of litigation or testimony at trial. Statements of causation are only admissible if they are reasonably pertinent to medical diagnosis and treatment.

Self-Authenticating Documents ? Rule 902

Some documents are self-authenticating, including (1) public documents of a government or governmental agency filed under seal and (2) public documents not under seal if signed by an official in an official capacity. In Craig v. Prairie Material Sales, Inc. (13 IWCC 1040) Respondent attempted to submit PubMed document entitled “Rheumatoid Arthritis” into evidence. The Arbitrator and Commission found the document was not self-authenticating. The document was not issued by public authority. Furthermore, it did not describe activities of agency or matters of which agency had duty to report. In Aragon v. Around the Clock Food Store and IWBF (13 IWCC 0118), Petitioner submitted a letter from an investigator at the IWCC Insurance Compliance Division to demonstrate the employer was uninsured. The Arbitrator excluded the document, but the Commission reversed. The document was self-authenticating because it contained the seal of the IWCC, an agency of the State.

Section 6(d) Application to Admissible Evidence

 

In PPG Industries v. Workers’ Compensation Commission (2014 IL App (4th) 130698WC) Petitioner brought a repetitive trauma claim before the Commission. Petitioner worked for her employer for thirty-eight years prior to claiming the repetitive trauma injury. The Arbitrator awarded compensation, basing the decision in large part on the testimony offered by Petitioner of a development of pain over a period of time. The Arbitrator also considered and rejected a statute of limitations argument raised by the employer regarding the admissibility of evidence from more than three years prior to the claim. This argument relied on Section 6(d) of the Act, which states in pertinent part:

In any case, other than one where the injury was caused by exposure to radiological materials or equipment or asbestos unless the application for compensation is filed with the Commission within 3 years after the date of the accident, where no compensation has been paid, or within 2 years after the date of the last payment of compensation, where any has been paid, whichever shall be later, the right to file such application shall be barred. 820 ILCS 305/6(d).

The employer appealed to the Commission, which slightly modified the PPD award but otherwise affirmed and adopted the Arbitrator’s ruling – including the rejection of the statute of limitations argument. The employer appealed to the Macon County Circuit Court, which was persuaded by the statute of limitations argument. The Circuit Court vacated, directing the Commission to consider only evidence of activities three years prior to the filing of the application. The Circuit Court then entered an order granting a motion for certification of an interlocutory appeal, namely to challenge the court’s application of Section 6(d) to exclude evidence. The certified question to the Appellate Court of the Fourth District was, “does section 6(d) of the *** Act, which sets forth a three[-]year statute of limitations for the filing of worker’s [sic] compensation claims, act as a bar  to the presentation of evidence of work activities that took place more than three years prior to date of accident, or manifestation date, of a repetitive[-]trauma injury?” (PPG at ¶12). The Appellate Court held no such evidentiary limitation existed stating, “It stands to reason that a claimant's work history may be necessary and relevant to determining whether she sustained a work-related, gradual injury.” (¶19). And further noting, “a claimant’s work history has been routinely considered in repetitive trauma cases, including work history that extended beyond three years prior to an alleged manifestation date.”  (Id.) Logically, the bar of such evidence would preclude Petitioner from testifying to any causation issues prior to a claim on which the three year statute is about to run. In our opinion, the Appellate Court reached the proper conclusion.

Though it seems incredible this question was granted an audience of such esteem, it is good to see the issue of evidence coming to the forefront of workers’ compensation litigation. The Administrative Procedure Act relaxes the standards of evidence in our forum, but its statutory constructionists hardly contemplated allowing proceedings to run amok, allowing clearly inadmissible evidence entrance to the record and denying admissible evidence its rightful consideration.

This article was researched and written by Lindsay Vanderford, J.D. Lindsay recently passed the IL Bar and will be sworn in as a licensed IL attorney and become the newest member of our defense team shortly. She can be reached at lvanderford@keefe-law.com for questions, comments and congratulations.

10-6-2014; Does IL WC Really Want to Encourage/Reward Thieves?; "Hot Bin" Explosion Premises Liability Analyzed by Brad Smith, JD; The 800lb Pink Gorilla in Our Coming Election and more

Synopsis: Does the IL WC System Really Want to Encourage and Reward Thieves?

 

Editor’s Comment: As licensed Illinois attorneys and court-watchers, we confirm for our readers the strongest respect for the venerated members of our Appellate and Supreme Courts. The men and women on those judicial bodies are of the highest caliber and beyond reproach. They have to deal with civil litigation and criminal law at the highest level. They are entrusted with our safety and security in interpreting and creating our law.

 

That said, we consider the unexpected and odd turn that has occurred in IL workers’ compensation law and practice to be a problem for all judges, justices, lawyers and other participants in the system. This week, we read an appellate ruling which can only be characterized as surprising and unusual because it reverses the Commission and awards an admitted thief almost six months of temporary total disability benefits and almost completely ignores the crimes he committed. Having read the ruling several times, we don’t see any way to view this ruling in a fashion that doesn’t encourage and reward criminal behavior in the workers’ comp injury recovery process.

 

In Matuszcsak v. Workers’ Compensation Commission, No. 2-13-0532WC, issued September 30, 2014 Claimant worked for Wal-Mart for over three years as a full-time night stocker. His job duties included taking 5 to 100-pound boxes off skids and neatly placing products in proper areas. On March 7, 2010, there is no dispute Claimant injured his neck, back, and right arm at work when several fully stocked shelves of glass cleaner fell on top of him. On March 9, 2010, Claimant began seeking medical care. Thereafter, he received conservative treatment from various providers and was consistently given modified-duty work restrictions. Following his accident, Claimant returned to work for Wal-Mart in a light-duty capacity. On May 23, 2011, claimant saw Dr. Mark Lorenz, who recommended surgery on claimant’s cervical spine.

 

Claimant admitted under oath, on June 12, 2011, he was terminated from his employment at Wal-Mart for several incidents of theft wholly unrelated to his work injury. Thereafter, Claimant remained unemployed. On cross-examination Claimant agreed, at the time of his termination, he prepared a handwritten statement acknowledging he stole cigarettes from Wal-Mart on June 3, 2011, and on a “couple of days” in May 2011. He agreed, at the time he took the cigarettes, he understood that stealing is a crime and stealing from his employer could and did result in termination.

 

What is most challenging for our readers to contemplate, Claimant acknowledged under oath that, had he not repeatedly stolen cigarettes, he would still be working for Wal-Mart in a light-duty capacity at the time of arbitration. In effect, Petitioner admitted he should have been terminated for several crimes he committed. In states outside Illinois, when you admit you committed a serious crime, you lose your job and the pay that comes with it. In Illinois, it appears injured workers on light duty can lose their jobs for dangerous and anti-social behavior but keep the pay or benefits that come with the job, even though they have been fired. Claimant/Admitted Thief Wally Matuszcsak received an award of TTD amounting to over $7,550. As licensed Illinois lawyers sworn to uphold the Illinois Constitution and laws of this state, we completely disagree with this approach.

 

On January 25, 2012, the Arbitrator issued his decision and determined Claimant sustained accidental injuries and awarded

 

·         23-2/7 weeks TTD benefits from the date of termination for theft to the date of the Arbitration hearing;

·         $14,227.41 in medical expenses; and

·         Prospective medical expenses--the surgery recommended by Dr. Lorenz.

 

In awarding almost six months of TTD, the Arbitrator noted Claimant was subject to light-duty restrictions that were being accommodated by the employer at the time of his termination, Petitioner did not return to work elsewhere after being terminated, and Claimant testified he was looking for work within his restrictions. We note Respondent did not appear to demonstrate the availability of light work in the area around Petitioner’s home. From a defense perspective, we would have placed such evidence into the record either via lay or expert testimony.

 

The legal theory we consider flawed and lacking solid common sense comes from two closely related factual findings by the Arbitrator that follow the Illinois Supreme Court’s 2010 ruling in Interstate Scaffolding v. IWCC. The Arbitrator determined

 

1.    Claimant’s medical condition had not “stabilized at the time of arbitration” and

2.    Claimant had not reached maximum medical improvement or MMI.

 

In our view, those concepts are so closely aligned, they are effectively identical. When those factors were present in the record, the Arbitrator ruled temporary benefits were due on a continuing basis. Please understand Claimant’s condition was unquestionably “stable” to the extent he was able to perform light work and could have been doing so during the pendency of the litigation. The IWCC panel knocked out the TTD award in their decision, Judge Wheaton in DuPage County reinstated TTD and the Appellate Court affirmed reinstatement of 23+ weeks of TTD. In our view, the ruling of the Appellate Court, WC Division mandates an award of TTD as a “matter of law” without any regard for how egregious the conduct leading to termination might be.

 

The asserted lack of medical “stability” arises from the recommendation from a noted surgeon that a medical procedure needed to be performed at an unknown future time. The finding about maximum medical improvement or MMI is another aspect of dealing with IL WC law and practice—like medical stability, “maximum medical improvement” is a buzzword or legal term that doesn’t appear and isn’t defined in our IL WC Act or Rules Governing Practice. This means these two terms were judicially adopted or created and implemented by our reviewing courts. The courts can provide the definition of those not-particularly-clear terms, as they see fit. The problem with courts creating such concepts as “judicial legislation” is WC system participants only get the snapshot on the new legal terms that our courts provide on a relatively random and case-by-case basis—they have to wait for claims to reach them to outline their rulings based upon the new facts.

 

If you understand the basic precepts of workers’ compensation law, this relatively new and unprecedented legal requirement that TTD or lost time benefits are due until an injured worker reaches a medically stable situation or maximum medical improvement makes little sense to us. The term in the IL WC Act “temporary total disability” doesn’t appear to be challenging to interpret. To us, it means the worker can’t work at all due to a temporary, work-related medical condition. A significant percentage of workers with serious lost time injuries return to light work long before reaching a state of medical stability or maximum medical improvement. If you ask the great surgeons across our state, such as Dr. Michael I. Vender, Dr. Andrew S. Zelby or Dr. Brian J. Cole, they will confirm returning to light work following many serious injuries is an irreplaceable part of the medical recovery process. In short, if you can work light duty, you are no longer “temporarily totally disabled” from all work. We are also aware of a large number of workers who remain in light duty positions, awaiting approval or rejection of a request for surgery, as Plaintiff-Petitioner Matuszcsak did in the case we are reporting.

 

We ask all our readers including lawyers on both sides how it can make the slightest bit of common sense to reward a self-confessed thief who took himself out of the ongoing light work in the Wal-Mart work force for admittedly committing several crimes? Does anyone feel this is a good idea? We note the IWCC did not follow a “lock-step” approach in reaching their decision to award or deny TTD when someone on light work loses their jobs due to crimes. We salute these administrators for doing so. We note Plaintiff-Petitioner in the Interstate Scaffolding ruling did not admit to criminal behavior, as Claimant Matuszcsak did and there were many factual conflicts in the earlier claim—it was not clear-cut. We urge our reviewing courts to reconsider these rulings and give the great hearing officers at our Workers’ Compensation Commission the power to weigh such claims on their merits, particularly where clear evidence of criminal behavior is in the record.

 

The problem our IWCC Commissioners may have anticipated was what might have happened if Claimant Matuszcsak had committed a more serious crime and not just petty thefts. What if a worker on light duty “goes postal?” What if he/she killed, robbed or seriously injured an innocent victim? Would he or she still be entitled to TTD? What if they pled guilty and ended up in prison? Would they still be entitled to months or years of TTD benefits while behind bars? Does that make sense to anyone?

 

In our view, the ruling by the Appellate Court, WC Division in Matuszcsak which follows their view of the theories outlined by our Supreme Court in Interstate Scaffolding, has this significant legal concern. From our respectful view, if a Claimant on light duty in this state commits a job rule violation or misdemeanor or serious felony and thereby loses their job, these courts leave no “wiggle-room” for our administrators to deny TTD benefits. It is our further view such a strained legal rule rewards and thereby implicitly encourages Petitioners to commit crimes. It is our hope the Appellate Court, WC Division approves this claim for further review by our highest court and the members of that body take the case and provide the entire WC community with guidance on how to best handle such matters without implicitly or explicitly rewarding criminal behavior.

 

We appreciate your thoughts and comments. Please post them on our award-winning blog.

 

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Synopsis: Obtaining Expert Help For Premises Dangers Extinguishes Liability of Owner When The Expert’s Workers Are Injured. Analysis by Bradley J. Smith, JD. 

 

Editor’s Comment: In an intriguing and important premises-liability ruling that we consider required reading for risk managers, a recent opinion written by Judge Easterbrook, the federal Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found a property owner was not liable for an independent contractor’s employees’ injuries, and further reversed the entry of punitive damages against the independent contractor. Please note this ruling may impact situations in which a safety engineer called to a premises to evaluate onsite dangers may not be able to sue the premises owner when they are injured due to the risk they were hired to prevent.

 

In Jentz v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., the problem was a “hot bin” or dangerous grain elevator. Explosions are a constant risk in grain storage, which produces not only a lot of combustible dust and carbon monoxide (which can oxidize explosively to carbon dioxide) but also, through the decay of a bin’s contents, heat that can set off a blast. In March 2010 ConAgra discovered a burning smell in bin C15, containing wheat pellets. ConAgra got in touch with West Side, which touts expertise in handling “hot bins.” ConAgra’s negotiations with West Side and its competitors delayed the start of work; West Side’s own busy schedule added to the delay.

 

Work finally began on April 20, 2010, and West Side hired A&J Bin Cleaning to do some of the necessary tasks. Two of the injured workers were employees of A&J; the third, Justin Becker, was employed by West Side itself. ConAgra wanted to salvage as much of the grain as possible, but as pellets were removed from the top more oxygen reached wheat composting at the bin’s bottom. West Side decided to remove some grain via side tunnels. On April 27, West Side employees detected smoke coming from the bin. Its crew sprayed water on the pellets and used an air lance to try to discover the smoke’s source; the effort failed. West Side’s foreman told ConAgra to call the fire department. Waiting for firefighters to arrive, the foreman for West Side  sent two of the Plaintiffs into a tunnel, instructing them to remove tools that might impair firefighters’ access. While they were there, the explosion occurred. They were severely injured in the blast.

 

After a seventeen (17) day trial, a jury awarded a whopping amount of nearly $180 million in compensatory and punitive damages against ConAgra Foods and West Side Salvage. ConAgra, which owned the facility, contended that liability rested on West Side, which it retained/hired the company to address the precise problems in the grain bin that led to the severe injuries to the West Side Salvage workers.. Both ConAgra and West Side contended the damages awarded were inappropriate and excessive. 

 

Normally, employees of an independent contractor cannot obtain damages from the owner of the premises at which the contractor or their employees were working. ConAgra contended Illinois law adopted the principle that someone who engaged an independent contractor to redress an unsafe condition is not liable when the feared dangerous event occurs.

 

West Side Salvage and the injured Plaintiffs unsuccessfully attempted to use the “firefighters’ rule.” However the Court quickly determined  West Side was not a volunteer, similar to a firefighter. In fact, they were hired to remediate the precise dangers leading to injuries. Accordingly, the normal rules of contract and tort law applied. Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit held ConAgra was not liable to these workers under tort law.

 

The Seventh Circuit also reasoned the $1 million punitive damages the jury ordered West Side to pay Jentz did not have proper evidentiary support. Particularly, under well-established Illinois law, an award of punitive damages requires willful and wanton conduct. The Seventh Circuit found the jury was presented with no evidence of willful and wanton conduct. 

 

Reasonably, contracting for help from an expert for a potential danger can and should shield a premises owner from liability if/when that feared dangerous event occurs.

 

This article was researched and written by Bradley J. Smith, J.D. Brad can be reached with any of your questions and concerns regarding general liability defense at bsmith@keefe-law.com.

 

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Synopsis: The 800lb Pink Gorilla in the Current Illinois State Election—Higher Income/Property Taxes Guaranteed with Doubling State and Chicago Government Pension Debt.

 

Editor’s comment: We are asking our readers a simple question—are you okay with Illinois state income taxes going to 8% on business income and personal income over $1M per year? Governor Quinn has already affirmed he wants state income tax to be 5% and House Speaker Madigan supports what we call the “Madigan-Hates-Millionaires-Tax” that will raise the top income tax rate in this state to 8%. Illinoisans are watching/listening to attack ads about silly things like nursing homes in 2003 and gift cards in 2005. No one appears to be addressing the major issues that are going to hit taxpayers very soon. Who can address any of it?

 

We are certain, if Governor Quinn is re-elected, significant state income tax hikes will happen next month, during the November veto session in our legislature. We will bet the legislation is already drafted. At the same time, Mayor Rahm Emanuel in Chicago is going to unleash millions in new property taxes that we assure you he is holding until the statewide election is over to avoid embarrassment to the Governor.

 

We just saw the Illinois Retail Merchants decide to sit on the fence and choose not endorse either candidate. We ask them to note an 8% income tax on their members is the equivalent of our State government grabbing one month or about 8% of gross annual income from all small, mid-sized and big businesses in our state. That can’t be a great idea for anyone who makes money in retail or health care or trading stocks/bonds or lawyers. We ask all the Plaintiff-Petitioner lawyers who read this KCB&A Update—are you ready to kick 8% of your gross income to the State of Illinois to fund our fake government pensions?

 

Democrats Need Republicans to Stay in This State, As We Are “Running Out of Other People’s Money”

 

Please also note Chicago Bears Quarterback Jay Cutler lives and is raising his family in Winnetka. The cost of an 8% state income tax to him will be $1,600,000 a year. He may be able to save substantial monies to move out of Illinois and return only for football practices and games. Lots of other businesses and successful individuals may also consider moving some or all of their operations outside Illinois to avoid the massive tax burden that may hit this state after the election. If the Democrats in power in this state push taxes/fees and tolls ever higher and higher, we are certain to see even more folks moving away from our state. As Illinois breadwinners and successful folks leave, the pressure on those who remain will heighten.

 

Even Dramatically Higher Taxes Probably Aren’t Going to Help Much—We Need a Groundbreaking Change in Illinois Government

 

As we advised, under Governor Quinn, Illinois State government debt was $54B just five years ago in 2009. It is over $105B right now. In five more years of mismanagement because nothing is being done to change the problem, it could be over $200B. The new spiraling taxes may fund some of the interest on all that debt but they won’t dent it. If/when it again doubles, we are going to be closer to a state government apocalypse. Are you okay with that?

 

Crain’s Chicago Business reported this week, the City of Chicago pensions' $37 Billion shortfall has doubled In 6 years under Democratic leadership in both Chicago and Springfield. This skyrocketing debt, according to a new report by the Civic Federation, is the total amount in unfunded liabilities for 10 local pension funds as of the end of fiscal 2012, two years ago. Total unfunded liability has been rising quickly, more than doubling since 2008, when it was $18.5 billion. But the increase from $32 billion in 2011 to $37.3 billion in 2012 was particularly large. If that doubles again and every indication is that it will, in the next five years, Chicago may be in federal bankruptcy court.

 

Why are they looking at 2012 figures? There's a lag in reporting because the watchdog group uses audited year-end financials from the 10 funds: the City of Chicago Police, Firefighters', Municipal and Laborers' funds; the Chicago Teachers' Pension Fund; and funds covering Cook County, the County Forest Preserve District, the Chicago Park District, Chicago Transit Authority and Metropolitan Water Reclamation District. In addition, Mayor Rahm Emanuel last year got through the Illinois Legislature and Governor Quinn a plan to revamp the much larger municipal and laborers' funds, an action that will require Chicago taxpayers to provide an additional $750 million in increased real estate taxes over the next five years. However, a related case involving state pension changes is headed to the Illinois Supreme Court, and if those are knocked out, Mr. Emanuel's recently approved changes could go, too. This will make the debt situation even more acute.

 

Even if those are upheld, no progress yet has been made on the Chicago teachers' pension fund, which was $8 billion short of having the assets required by the actuaries to meet its spending promises. And no progress has been made with the Chicago police and firefighter funds, which had just 30.8 percent and 24.4 percent of the needed assets on hand, respectively.

 

Please remember neither the participants in these funds are putting nearly enough money into the fake pensions nor are the respective governments putting enough in. As a single example, a Chicago school teacher only contributes 2% of their annual salary into their fake pension program. After twenty years, they are owed benefits for life and will get all their contributions back in less than a year on the pension.

 

As we tell our children, you have to fix things or the world will fix them for you. If you look at Governor Quinn’s campaign website right now, they aren’t addressing or even mentioning this 800lb pink gorilla. We hope Illinoisans are smart enough to see the treacherous path in front of us, find new leaders and not wait for the government apocalypse to start.

 

The election is on November 4, 2014. Please be sure to vote. We appreciate your thoughts and comments. Please post them on our award-winning blog.

9-29-14; FedEx Ruling Endangers Mandatory Accident Reporting Rules; "Distraction Exception" in Muni Sidewalk Claims Rev'd by IL Supreme Ct; Monster Legal Fee Award with analysis by Brad Smith and more

Synopsis: Federal District Court Rules FedEx Discharged A Worker in Retaliation for Not Providing Notice Prior to Getting Work-Related Medical Care.

 

Editor’s comment: We feel sure this ruling will be appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals—in our view, it won’t stop at the District Court level and we will have to await the appellate outcome to be sure where it will all go. However, we are certain this ruling “endangers” or calls into question the legal viability of

 

Ø  Same-shift accident reporting rules or

Ø  Any requirement a worker first advise the employer before obtaining work-related medical attention.

 

As long-time court watchers and with respect to this august and veteran federal judge, we wholly disagree with the approach used. FedEx did not refuse to have this worker get medical care. We feel it is safe to assume the medical care obtained under the IL WC Act was paid for by the employer. Having read the decision, we don’t feel the employee was fired for needing and getting work-related medical attention. The termination was for not reporting the medical care until after it happened. There is no provision in the IL WC Act which makes it “illegal” for an employer to ask employees to timely report the need for medical care. In fact, there are hundreds of safety and personnel reasons supporting the need for such reporting.

 

As a rapid example, take the recent controversy about the employee who appears to have been suffering from severe psychiatric concerns. The damage done by him at the FAA radar facility in Aurora was so extensive the center might not be operational for several days. Thousands of flights were cancelled and the cost will be well into the millions. The suspect, who set several fires with rags and gasoline in the basement, managed to shut down all radar and communications systems in the facility. Would it be a bad thing for his employer to require him to report he was getting work-related psychiatric or other medical care?

 

In Stevenson v. FedEx, No. 13 C 138, published 9/24/14, there was no dispute about the basic facts. Defendant FedEx employed Plaintiff Stevenson as a package handler. As of January 2011, Stevenson was subject to a FedEx company policy that required immediate reporting of workplace injuries whether they required only minor first aid or medical treatment. In addition, FedEx policy required employees wishing to seek medical treatment for a workplace injury first attempt to provide advance notice to management via a free 24-hour phone line or other means. Under this company policy, failure to notify management before seeking work-related medical care could subject the employee to immediate termination.

 

On January 6, 2011, Stevenson reported to supervisors that he was suffering from a sore back. FedEx generated a First Aid/Injury Report and placed Stevenson on light duty to accommodate his condition. He did not request or seek medical treatment at that time. After working light duty for five days, Plaintiff Stevenson sought medical treatment for his back without first advising FedEx. The physician assistant or PA who examined him provided a “Certificate to Return to Work,” which cleared Stevenson to return to work. Stevenson began his next shift, as previously scheduled, at 10:30 p.m. on January 13 and worked until about 7:00 a.m. and worked light duty as FedEx had not yet returned him to regular duty. At the end of his shift, Stevenson presented the note from the PA, thereby notifying FedEx he had already sought and received medical care for the January 6 incident. Citing the company policy that required advance notice before seeking medical treatment for a prior workplace injury, FedEx terminated Stevenson’s employment.

 

Stevenson then brought a retaliatory discharge action. FedEx removed the action to the federal District Court. The federal court noted under Illinois law, it is unlawful for an employer to terminate an employee in retaliation for exercising a right guaranteed by the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act. For claims alleging retaliatory discharge for the exercise of IWCA rights, the employee must prove

 

Ø  Status as an employee of Defendant;

Ø  Exercise of a right granted by the IL WC Act, and

Ø  Causal relationship between discharge and the exercise of that right.

 

The federal court indicated the parties agreed Stevenson was a FedEx employee and that a causal relationship exists between Stevenson’s actions and Stevenson’s termination. They simply disagree about whether all of his actions were protected. FedEx concedes the IL WC Act protects Stevenson’s actions in seeking medical care from his own provider and in later filing a Workers’ Compensation claim, but contends that the sole cause of his termination was not the fact he sought medical treatment but rather his failure to notify the company before he did so. The federal judge reviewed the motions of both parties and noted Plaintiff Stevenson did not dispute the cause of his termination: “Plaintiff admits he was terminated on January 17, 2011, for failing to notify his supervisors or management prior to seeking medical attention for a work injury.”

 

The federal judge also noted her feelings FedEx repeatedly mischaracterized Plaintiff’s argument as asserting his termination was based solely on the fact he sought medical treatment, ignoring Plaintiff’s repeated statements “Defendant unlawfully . . . interfered with Plaintiff’s rights by requiring him to notify his supervisor prior to seeking medical attention for a work injury.” The Court felt the remaining question, then, was whether the IL WC Act grants employees the right to seek medical care for a prior workplace injury without first notifying a supervisor.

 

Stevenson’s argument rests on the fact the IL WC Act prohibits employers from interfering with an employee’s attempt to exercise rights provided in the statute. The Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act provides, in relevant

part:

 

(h) It shall be unlawful for any employer . . . to interfere with, restrain or coerce an employee in any manner whatsoever in the exercise of the rights or remedies granted to him or her by this Act . . . . It shall be unlawful for any employer . . . to discharge . . . an employee because of the exercise of his or her rights or remedies granted to him or her by this Act.

 

Because one of the rights guaranteed by the IL WC Act is the right to seek medical treatment, Plaintiff Stevenson argued the IL WC Act therefore protects the right of employees to secure one’s own medical provider without interference “in any manner whatsoever.” In its briefs, FedEx did not dispute the legal premise of Stevenson’s argument the IL WC Act provides the right to seek medical care without interference. Rather, FedEx asserted its advance notification requirement does not interfere with the right of an injured worker to receive medical care and was justified by legitimate corporate and safety concerns.

 

FedEx raised several examples of workplace policies that have been recognized by the courts as valid defenses to retaliatory discharge claims, but those polices are easily distinguished from the policy challenged here; none involved action by an employer that imposed any precondition on an employee’s exercise of rights provided by the IL WC Act:

 

·         In McCoy v. Maytag Corp., 495 F.3d 515 (7th Cir. 2007), the employer terminated an employee who had failed to submit post-treatment status reports during a doctor-ordered leave of absence.

·         In Casanova v. American Airlines, Inc., 616 F.3d 695 (7th Cir. 2010), the employer was permitted to engage in post-treatment investigation and surveillance to determine whether an employee had fraudulently claimed a false injury, and could terminate the employee for lying and refusing to cooperate with the investigation.

·         Goode v. American Airlines, Inc., 741 F. Supp. 2d 877, 893–94 (N.D. Ill. 2010), endorsing the permissibility of a zero-tolerance policy against dishonesty in filing workers’ compensation claims.

 

In each of these cases cited above, this federal court felt violations of company policy occurred after the employees had already exercised some of their rights under the IL WC Act and in no way interfered with the employee’s ability to obtain medical treatment. In this case, by contrast, this federal court ruled Stevenson could not exercise his right to medical treatment without first complying with a policy imposed by the company that required him to take affirmative actions he would not otherwise have to take. The federal court ruled such actions by the employer were plainly “interference”—an act hampering action or procedure. As we indicate above, we feel any of the three cases above could arguably be ruled “retaliation” for the exercise of workers’ compensation rights—who cares when the worker is fired if the termination is for something that happened at any time during a workers’ comp claim?

 

We appreciate your thoughts and comments. Please post them on our award-winning blog.

 

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Synopsis: Keep Your Eyes on the Sidewalk! Important Illinois Supreme Court ruling on the “Open and Obvious” Doctrine as it relates to your City’s sidewalks. Analysis by Daniel J. Boddicker, JD. 

 

Editor’s Comment: In a decision that affects all Illinois municipalities, the Illinois Supreme Court determined the issue of whether the “distraction exception” to the open and obvious rule applied in a situation involving a known sidewalk defect.

 

In Bruns v. City of Centralia, Plaintiff Virginia Bruns stubbed her toe on a crack in the city sidewalk, which allegedly caused her to fall and injure her arm, leg, and knee. Prior to Plaintiff’s fall, she was looking towards the door and the steps of an eye clinic she was attending. Plaintiff testified to her prior knowledge of the sidewalk defect that had developed over a period of several years due to tree roots causing the sidewalk to crack and become uneven. The City was notified of prior trip and falls at the location, but decided not to authorize removal because of the 100-year-old tree’s historic significance.

 

Plaintiff alleged the City negligently maintained the sidewalk, failed to inspect and repair the sidewalk, and permitted the sidewalk to remain in a dangerous condition. Subsequently, the City filed a motion for summary judgment arguing the defect was open and obvious as a matter of law. Logically, the City further argued it was not required to foresee and protect against injuries from a potentially dangerous condition that was open and obvious.

 

Plaintiff countered by arguing the City should have reasonably foreseen a pedestrian could become distracted and fail to protect itself against the dangerous condition. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment.

 

On appeal, our very liberal Fifth District Appellate Court disagreed and reversed the trial court. That court concluded the City had a duty to remedy the sidewalk defect in a reasonable time frame, but whether the City breached this duty was a fact question for the jury. The Appellate Court stated the key question is the foreseeability of the likelihood an individual’s attention may be distracted from the open and obvious condition, and it is certainly reasonable to foresee that an elderly patron of an eye clinic might have her attention focused on the pathway forward to the door and steps of the clinic as opposed to the path immediately underfoot.

 

The IL Supreme Court reasoned the only issue is whether under the facts the City owed a duty to plaintiff. It noted the four factors which guide the court on duty analysis as:

 

Ø  the reasonable foreseeability of the injury,

Ø  the likelihood of the injury,

Ø  the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury, and

Ø  the consequences of placing that burden on the defendant.

 

The Supreme Court further reasoned it also had to consider whether the distraction exception to the open and obvious rule applied. Accordingly, they reversed the Appellate Court and reinstated the trial court’s denial of the claim. In doing so, the Supreme Court held that looking elsewhere does not constitute a distraction. Instead, the essential determination is not whether Plaintiff was looking elsewhere, but why she was looking elsewhere.

 

This article was researched and written by Daniel J. Boddicker, J.D.  Dan can be reached with any of your questions or concerns regarding municipality defense and/or general liability defense at dboddicker@keefe-law.com

 

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Synopsis: Here is Another Reason You Need Reasonable Employment Law Defense Counsel from KCB&A! In a Seventh Circuit Opinion, Judge Easterbrook affirmed a local district judge's allocation of $325,000.00 in attorneys’ fees on a recovery of less than $50,000.00 for a violation of the FMLA. Analysis by Bradley J. Smith, J.D.

 

Editor's Comment: In a recent opinion written by Seventh Circuit Judge Easterbrook, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court's award to the attorney of an employee $325,000.00 in a Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") action, despite the fact the employee's recovery was less than $50,000.00. The District Court applied the principle that hyper-aggressive defendants who drive up the expense of litigation must pay the full costs/fees of the other side, even if the legal fees seem excessive in retrospect.

 

In Cuff v. Trans State Holdings, Inc., an employee, whom was an airline supplier's regional manager, represented the supplier and supplier’s two air carriers in their dealings with the airline and airport, brought a FMLA action against the air carriers. After extensive litigation, a partial summary judgment motion, and a jury trial, the employee recovered less than $50,000.00. However, the District Court awarded the prevailing employee attorneys’ fees pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(3), which authorizes attorneys’ fees to a winning Plaintiff.

 

The Court noted Defendants injected numerous unnecessary issues and arguments into the case. For example, Defendants' lawyers contended Plaintiff was not qualified for FMLA leave because he was not taking prescribed medications. Instead, the court framed the proper issue before it as whether the employee has medical need for leave at the time he requested time off.

 

Defendants also attempted to present multiple pieces of “after-acquired evidence” at trial, but the District judge sustained objections based on Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Despite his rulings, Defendants failed to make an offer of proof of the proposed evidence. Consequently, the ruling’s prejudicial effects were waived by Defendants’ failure to preserve them through an offer of proof. 

 

The District Court judge reasoned the attorneys' fees award on the proposition that hyper-aggressive defendants who drive up the expense of litigation must pay the full costs, even if legal fees seem excessive in retrospect. The Seventh Circuit agreed and further reasoned the high total of attorneys' fees was an expected result of the way the defense was conducted. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the award of $325,000.00 in attorneys' fees coinciding with the less than $50,000.00 in actual recovery on the case. 

 

At Keefe, Campbell, Biery & Associates, LLC, we determine the most efficient and practical defense(s) to defend employment law claims brought against you. Although we always zealously defend our clients, we also keep in the forefront all facets of a claim to give our clients the best service possible. When there are the potential for attorneys’ fees awarded to the victorious party, we always include that factor in our initial assessment of the defense of a claim. If you have an employment law claim brought against you, then  reach out to the employment law defense team at Keefe, Campbell, Biery & Associates, LLC for an initial assessment of the claim.

 

This article was researched and written by Bradley J. Smith, J.D. Brad can be reached with any of your questions or concerns regarding employment law and general liability defense at bsmith@keefe-law.com.