12-15-14; Please Release Me, Understanding HIPAA-GINA; Reviewing the IL WC System in a "Kleptocracy"; Important Medical Bill Collection Ruling, analysis by Lindsay Vanderford, JD and much more

Synopsis: Please Release Me!! How HIPAA-GINA Work to Protect/Regulate All of Us in Workers’ Comp Claims.

 

Editor’s comment: We get asked all the time and we want our readers to best understand HIPAA-GINA in your day-to-day WC claims handling. If you aren’t sure, HIPAA is about medical records privacy. GINA is about genetic privacy in medical records and any other records you might keep about your workers. These two concepts are federal law to which we are all subject. As defense lawyers, we assure everyone you can’t skip the requirements of federal law if you handle U.S. workers’ comp claims.

 

What is initially confusing about HIPAA-GINA is the U.S. Department of Labor has an “exception” to the laws for workers’ comp claims. Every reader and anyone attending one of our many presentations/webinar always asks what in tarnation that might mean. No one initially understands what an “exception” to a federal law could be. They don’t have “exceptions” to traffic laws, do they?

 

For clarity, the “exception” to HIPAA-GINA is on the web at 45 CFR 164.512(l) (Download a copy in PDF). It starts by saying:

 

The HIPAA Privacy Rule does not apply to entities that are either workers’ compensation insurers, workers’ compensation administrative agencies, or employers, except to the extent they may otherwise be covered entities. However, these entities need access to the health information of individuals who are injured on the job or who have a work-related illness to process or adjudicate claims, or to coordinate care under workers’ compensation systems. Generally, this health information is obtained from health care providers who treat these individuals and who may be covered by the Privacy Rule. The Privacy Rule recognizes the legitimate need of insurers and other entities involved in the workers’ compensation systems to have access to individuals’ health information as authorized by State or other law. Due to the significant variability among such laws, the Privacy Rule permits disclosures of health information for workers’ compensation purposes in a number of different ways. 

 

In short, if you have a workers’ comp claim, you may not have to worry about HIPAA-GINA, if the stars align and everyone knows the rule above and follows it. The problem is medical care givers, doctors and hospitals may or may not know the “exception” and typically don’t care—they still want a signed HIPAA-GINA release to be sure they are routinely following the law.

 

Why is that a good idea for doctors/hospitals and other folks in that industry? Well, we ask all of our readers—when is a claim for accident or exposure truly a workers’ compensation claim? The simple answer to this question is—no one knows! By that we mean, if you slam your foot into a wall at work, it is up to you to decide whether you want the necessary medical care to be workers’ compensation or group health. If you are embarrassed about a safety mistake and/or don’t want your employer to deal with your foot injury as a work comp matter for whatever reason, it isn’t a work comp claim! You can actually later decide you want work comp coverage which would make access to medical records fall under the “exception” above. You might then withdraw the claim which would put access to your records outside the exception. It is also possible either the injured/ill worker or their selected attorney might withdraw their HIPAA-GINA release and demand all medical records be kept completely secret. They might sue you under HIPAA-GINA if you won’t follow their wishes. In short, the applicability of the HIPAA-GINA exception for WC claims may be contingent on numerous ever-changing factors. For that reason, we consider reliance on the exception to be a claims mistake.

 

Our advice to everyone in the industry is to routinely have your injured/ill workers who are claiming the injury/illness is related to work complete:

 

·         An Accident/Work-Related Illness Investigation Form;

·         A HIPAA-GINA compliant release.

 

We suggest such documents be combined into one longer form. If you need a copy of our accident investigation/HIPAA-GINA release forms, send a reply and we will shoot them to you via email at no charge.

 

If you have a signed HIPAA-GINA compliant form, you have full and complete access to printed and electronic copies of medical records and bills. You won’t then care if the claim is workers’ comp or not workers’ comp—you still have the ability to obtain and safely store the records. You won’t need to rely on the “exception” above in any way.

 

Don’t I Have to Keep the Medical Records/Bills Safe and Private?

 

Youbetcha! All medical records and bills should come with an implied privacy stamp on them. We don’t mean you have to print the word “private” on them but you have to be sure they are all kept private and away from prying eyes. If you don’t, you may get sued. One question we ask corporate safety/risk managers in our readership—do you have a fax machine or computer in your office used for transmission of medical records/bills open to viewing or use by workers that aren’t in safety/risk management? If you have such a fax machine or computer, we assure you that you are breaking U.S. law. Any fax machine or computer that is used to receive medical records and bills has to be in a locked office that is only accessed by your HIPAA-GINA “privacy circle” managers. If you need assistance with this concept, send a reply.

 

How Does This Apply to WC Nurse Case Managers?

 

It applies the same way it applies to adjusters.

 

Ø  If you have our signed HIPAA-GINA release, you have full authority from the patient to get medical records and bills and forward to the insurance carrier/TPA.

Ø  If you don’t have a signed HIPAA-GINA release, you are taking a chance to get medical records and bills but should be protected under the “exception” above.

Ø  If you have a signed HIPAA-GINA release and the release is withdrawn by claimant or counsel as they are entitled to do under federal law, it is problematic to rely on the “exception” and we recommend not doing so.

 

If the release is withdrawn, our vote is to work out a deal on “transparency” with Claimant and/or their counsel to insure the attorneys are getting the same reports as the insurance company/TPA. Happy to explain.

 

Wassup with this GINA Thing?

 

If you are routinely asking your workers about family history of heart attack, stroke or other medical conditions at any time, you have to have a signed GINA compliant release or you may be violating U.S. law. Our vote is to get such questions out of any document you are using. The Feds went after an employer that didn’t know the new and hard-to-understand rule and got a $100K settlement from them to demonstrate the seriousness of genetic privacy.

 

We appreciate your thoughts and comments. Please post them on our award-winning blog. We remind you we are offering out HIPAA-GINA complaint release free of charge—just send a reply.

 

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Synopsis: Understanding the IL WC System in What Some Are Now Calling a “Kleptocracy.”

 

Editor’s comment: We saw this new term in the Chicago Tribune and will let you draw your own thoughts on whether the State of Illinois can be fairly termed a “kleptocracy.” The term is defined as a form of political and governmental rule where the government exists to increase the personal wealth and political power of its officials and government workers at the expense of the wider population, often with the pretense of honest service. The term is mildly misleading as there is an implication kleptocrats are “stealing”—you can’t truly “steal” when you have the appropriate legal authority to give yourself and your buddies buckets of taxpayer money. Not an "official" form of government (such as democracy, republic, monarchy, theocracy), the term is a pejorative for governments perceived to have a systemic problem with the selfish appropriation of public funds by those in power. The effects of a kleptocratic regime or government are typically adverse to the state's economy, political affairs and civil rights. Kleptocracy in government vitiates prospects of outside investment and drastically weakens cross-border trade. As the kleptocracy normally takes money from its citizens via tax payments, a kleptocratically structured political system tends to degrade nearly everyone's quality of life. In addition, the money kleptocrats take is sometimes derived from funds earmarked for important public needs, such as the building of hospitals, schools, roads, parks and the like which has further adverse effects on the quality of life of the citizens. The quasi-oligarchy that results from a kleptocratic elite also subverts democracy or any other political format.

 

We Ask You—is Illinois State Government a Kleptocracy?


Please note our past IL Governors and state legislature have blown/spent/squandered over $110,000,000,000 with most of it being spent on pensions and other lavish benefits for retired state workers. Illinois state workers may have locked in their lifetime benefits, including healthcare in the “You-Can’t-Ever-Change-Our-Pensions-Clause” in the kleptocratic Illinois state constitution.

 

The worst IL state pension program by a mile is the Legislative Retirement System or LRS. As you read this, that system by itself is costing state taxpayers over $100M a year and rising. To our understanding, that system routinely pays more money to retired legislators than they made while working in part-time jobs. Please also remember that program is not being “reformed” and is not the subject of the litigation currently before the IL Supreme Court. Please also note all retired legislators gave themselves a lifetime 3% compounded boost every year. Please further note all retired Illinois state workers receive taxpayer-paid lifetime health care coverage on the taxpayer’s dime—that seems kleptocratic to us.

 

With deepest respect to a great woman and politician who recently passed away, we always felt former Comptroller Judy Baar Topinka was a “reluctant kleptocrat” who wanted the salaries of state workers to be out there on the web for all to see. She also received a state legislative pension of about $180K a year when she might have contributed a tiny fraction of that lifetime amount in the six years she was in the Illinois legislature. Judy Baar Topinka’s annual income also demonstrated a very irritating aspect of the “pension” program in this kleptocratic state—she was on a pension that was almost fully paid by your current tax dollars without actually retiring. If you aren’t sure, Ms. Topinka’s annual income from the Comptroller’s job and her pension was well over $300,000.

 

How Does Kleptocracy Affect Our IL WC System?

 

Well, that happens in lots of ways at high cost to Illinois taxpayers at the local, regional and state levels. As we have advised:

 

v  Firefighters in this state don’t have to be working when injured to receive workers’ compensation benefits—the Kleptocrats in Springfield passed a law creating a presumption of WC coverage for veteran firefighters who become injured or ill while admittedly off work. Do you feel a firefighter at a Sox game with his kids who has an unexpected stroke should get lifetime WC benefits on your dime?

 

v  Police officers and firefighters who are injured at work and can no longer return to their official duties are given generous line-of-duty disability benefits—that benefit makes sense to most folks. As a demonstration of how WC works in a kleptocracy, the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission also gives such workers generous and legislatively undefined “loss of trade” benefits, as something of a going-away present from unknowing taxpayers. The words “loss of trade” are not contained in the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act so we consider it impossible to argue/appeal for the relative value of such a permanency award—how much is “loss of trade” supposed to be?

 

v  As another example of kleptocracy, we are certain there may be hundreds and maybe thousands of State of Illinois and City of Chicago workers who become disabled from work and then are cast aside in what would otherwise be an obvious violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act when the two governments will not accommodate their disabilities or find them alternative jobs. The reason such workers don’t ever file a beef is purely kleptocratic—they are routinely given “odd-lot” total and permanent disability benefits that can be as much as $70,000 a year or more on a lifetime, tax-free basis. Such benefits now come with annual COLA kickers which our Springfield kleptocrats added about a decade ago. All of the money for such benefits come from taxpayers—there is no “contribution” like there is in the hilariously misfunded state pension systems.

 

v  In the kleptocratic WC claims management programs for both the State of Illinois and City of Chicago, everything is kept hush-hush. To our understanding both of our state’s largest governments spend well over $100M a year to give taxpayer dollars to government workers. If anyone in the private sector gave away that much WC money to their workers, you would certainly be fired and/or the company would go broke. Oooops, both governments are rapidly approaching insolvency. We have never seen anyone at either government start a WC cost-savings program or seek consultants to cut WC costs, like we saw with the City of Springfield and other local governments. For one example, take a look http://www.sj-r.com/article/20130224/News/302249938.

 

We do feel injured state and city workers should be taken care of and don’t oppose reasonable benefits for such workers. We don’t feel pensions, workers’ comp, group healthcare or any state benefit should be provided in a fashion similar to winning the lottery. We hope the great minds and managers in incoming Governor-elect Bruce Rauner’s administration can start to address some of these anomalies and make stronger sense of Illinois government moving forward.

 

We appreciate your thoughts and comments. Please post them on our award-winning blog.

 

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Synopsis: Medical Billing/Debt Collection Ruling of Note for Hospitals/Doctors/NCM’s Trying To Collect Unpaid Bills.

Editor’s comment: The federal Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held it is a Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (“FDCPA”) violation to file a collection action outside of a debtor’s hometown municipal court. Analysis by Lindsay R. Vanderford, JD.

In Suesz v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, the Seventh Circuit retroactively altered common practice in medical bill collection and other similar cases. In doing so, the Court’s decision requires collection cases to be filed in the Cook County Suburban Municipal District where the debtor lives or where the contract was signed. If not filed there, then it is an FDCPA violation. The Suesz case was remanded to the Southern District Court of Indiana for further proceedings. More recently, a petition for a writ of certiorari was filed with the United States Supreme Court.

On July 2, 2014, the Seventh Circuit ruled that filing a collection case in a municipal court other than where the debtor lives or the originating contract was signed was a violation of the FDCPA. In Suesz, a consumer filed a class action lawsuit against a medical billing collections agency alleging its regular business practice was to file lawsuits in small claims courts located in townships where the consumer neither lives nor signed the contract that created the debt. In doing so, the consumer alleged the medical billing collections agency violated the FDCPA.

Plaintiff lived in Hancock County, Indiana. He entered into a contract with a hospital in Marion County, Indiana. Marion County is divided into several townships, each of which has its own small claims court. The collection agency sued the consumer in Pike Township Small Claims Court. The provider to whom the debt was owed is located in Lawrence Township. Explicitly, the FDCPA requires debt collectors to sue consumers in the "judicial district or similar legal entity" where the consumer lives or where the consumer signed the contract being sued on. See 15 U.S.C. §1692i(a)(2).

Notably, the Suesz Court determined FDCPA does not define the term "judicial district." After a lengthy discussion of the various means of defining the term, the Seventh Circuit held "the relevant judicial district or similar legal entity is the smallest geographic unit relevant for venue purposes in the court system in which the case was filed, regardless of the source of the venue rules." The Suesz Court also expressly overruled Newsom v. Friedman which held the six municipal districts in the Circuit Court of Cook County were not “judicial districts” under the FDCPA. The Circuit Court of Cook County is divided into six municipal districts, each of which has its own courthouse. Each courthouse handles small claims lawsuits, inter alia. Prior to the Suesz decision, debt collectors filed their small claims actions against Cook County residents at the Richard J. Daley Center, which services Cook County’s First Municipal District. In doing so, debt collectors relied on the Newsom decision.

The Suesz holding’s retroactive application is particularly troubling. The Seventh Circuit was asked to overrule Newsom without retroactive application as debt collectors were relying on Newsom when filing their lawsuits. The court declined to do so stating, "reliance on prior law is insufficient in itself to justify making a new judicial ruling prospective." It further noted reliance on the opinion of one intermediate appellate court was not justified as one decision did not rise to the degree of certainty necessary for such reliance. 

The Suesz Court's retroactive application creates a significant problem for debt collectors in Cook County. Many of the small claims cases on file at the Richard J. Daley Center as of the July 2, 2014 date of the decision could potentially violate the FDCPA's venue provisions. Any lawsuit that should have been filed at the courthouses located in Skokie, Maywood, Rolling Meadows, Bridgeview, or Markham could trigger liability under the FDCPA. An immediate motion to transfer to the appropriate Municipal District is a necessary move for our readers involved in such litigation.

We recommend retaining counsel familiar with the FDCPA when attempting to collect on an unpaid debt. In doing so, call a KCB&A attorney to determine how to properly bring your cause of action in the correct venue in order to avoid the FDCPA’s harsh penalties. 

This article was researched and written by Lindsay R. Vanderford, JD. Lindsay can be reached with questions regarding collection actions and workers’ compensation at lvanderford@keefe-law.com.

12-8-14; PART I Rising Min. Wage Bad for Jobs--Good for Your IL WC Claims; Brad Smith, JD Reviews Important ADA Win for Business; WCLA CLE Review by John Karis and much more

Synopsis: Higher Minimum Wage is Bad for Jobs but Great for Claims Adjusting in IL Workers’ Compensation.

 

Editor’s comment: We hate to see our State keep pushing the button on the very populist theory of raising the minimum wage. Our former Governor basically ran almost his entire campaign on the concept because the people who were in his camp love the idea of getting raises without having to do anything other than vote for them. Our main problem with a high minimum wage is the concept is a jobs-buster. Real economic growth would naturally increase the demand for labor-increasing wages without costing jobs. Perhaps the best example of this is from Williston, North Dakota where their vibrant and growing economy is creating a strong demand for labor. Crew-level restaurant employees are already making $11 to $15 an hour and big box retailers are offering work starting at $17 an hour. Even without a government mandate, wages will be higher in any region where economic growth increases the demand for labor.

 

From the workers’ compensation perspective in the State of Illinois, higher minimum wages are a counterpoint and may cut the popularity of the worst of Illinois WC benefits—wage loss differential benefits. In order to qualify for Section 8(d)(1) differential benefits, Claimant must prove two things:

 

ü  a partial incapacity which prevents the pursuit of his/her “usual and customary line of employment,” and

ü  an impairment of earnings.

 

The wage differential was to be paid for the duration of disability which had previously interpreted to mean “for life” – not “work life,” even if after an award was rendered, the employee changed jobs resulting in a change of wages. This aspect of the ruling made the values on a wage loss claim very high. However, for claims starting in 2011 and after, the Amendments to the IL WC Act now mandate wage differential benefits would terminate when the employee reaches the age of 67 or five (5) years after the award becomes final, whichever is later.

 

Under the IL WC Act, Petitioner cannot recover for both section 8(d)(1) wage differential and a specific loss of use for a man as a whole under section 8(e) or section 8(d)(2). In a wage loss differential claim, the injured worker is entitled to 2/3 of the difference between what they would be making now based on the job they had at the time of the injury and what they are able to make in alternative work at present. From our perspective, the IWCC doesn’t want and won’t provide total and permanent disability benefits if the doctors and medical care providers agree the injured worker can locate some sort of alternative work after recovering from their injury. And the Americans With Disabilities Act also federally mandates reasonable accommodation in the hiring process, so injured workers have to be provided job modifications and other adaptations to allow them to return to functionality.

 

So is the current and coming math on traditional IL WC wage loss calculations. We are assuming the worker would be making $800 a week in the job they had prior to injury. They become injured and don’t recover fully and the only work they can now locate is an entry-level job at minimum wage:

 

·         At the current federal minimum wage of $7.25 per hour times 40, the worker would be making $290.00 per week. Wage differential would be calculated as $800 minus $290 times 2/3 or $340 a week.

 

·         At the current Illinois minimum wage of $8.25 per hour times 40, the worker would be making $330.00 per week. Wage diff would be $800 minus $330 times 2/3 or $313.33 per week.

 

·         At the minimum wage of $9 passed by the IL Senate that is to start in July 2015, wage diff would be $800 minus $360 times 2/3 would be $293.33 per week.

 

·         At the Chicago minimum wage, the City-mandated raises are $10.00 per hour by July 1, 2015, then $11 by 2017, and $13 by 2019. Wage diff for jobs in Chicago will soon be calculated $800 minus $400 times 2/3 or $266.67 a week. Those values are sure to be getting lower and lower, as the minimum wage goes up and up.

 

·         In calculating the minimum wage at the future City of Chicago rate of $13 per hour in 2019, the math is $800 less $520 times 2/3 or $186.67. This means such a wage loss claim would provide an annual benefit of only $9,706.84 a year and more traditional permanency values for serious work injuries may supplant wage loss.

 

We feel these coming numbers can be used right now to start to recalculate reserves and settlements on any wage loss differential claim. We are happy to assist risk managers and claims handlers in doing so.

 

We also have a great claim strategy on how to completely avoid or end wage loss differential claims for construction and other industries. If you have interest in learning how to cut reserves and save millions by completely avoiding wage loss claims, send a reply.

 

If you have questions and concerns about how this will impact your current IL WC claims, send a reply and we will get right back to you.

 

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Synopsis: Document! Document! Document Performance and Absences! In an Employment Law opinion as it relates to the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Seventh Circuit affirmed entry of summary judgment on a diligent employer’s behalf. Analysis by Bradley J. Smith, J.D.

 

Editor's Comment: In Taylor-Novotny v. Health Alliance Medical Plans, Inc., the Seventh Circuit rejected the employee’s claims of 1) failure to accommodate multiple sclerosis under the ADA; 2) discrimination and retaliation based on a disability; 3) interference with Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) rights; and 4) discrimination based on race. The Court reasoned the employee could not succeed on her ADA claims because she failed to establish she was a “qualified individual” under the ADA.  The Court further determined the employee failed to meet her employer’s legitimate expectations for punctuality and accountability. Consequently, the Court’s determination of failure to meet her employer’s legitimate expectations was also fatal to the employee’s race discrimination claims. Next, the Court concluded the employee did not establish the reasonableness of her accommodation request and also the evidence presented for her ADA retaliation claim was insufficient to form a “convincing mosaic” suggesting her employer retaliated against her because she sought accommodations. Last, the Court reasoned the employer never denied the employee any FMLA leave. 

 

From a period of January 2007 through and including the employee’s termination in 2010, the employer repeatedly documented the employee’s issues with attendance and tardiness in its annual performance reviews. Shortly after the initial performance review, the employee was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis. In October 2007, the employee was placed on a Corrective Action Plan regarding her tardiness. A majority of the performance reviews and documentation demonstrated a finding of marginal performance relating to attendance and punctuality throughout her employment. On May 25, 2008, the employee submitted FMLA Certification paperwork to the employer for her multiple sclerosis requesting certification of intermittent FMLA leave related to her illness and the fatigue derived from it. Although the employer authorized the FMLA intermittent leave, it further informed the employee it was her responsibility to alert her manager each time an absence from work would be necessary, as well as whether or not her absence should be charged to the approved FMLA leave. In December 2008, the employer began allowing the employee to work from home three (3) days per week. In May 2009, the employee received an additional FMLA Certification approval for intermittent leave. Again, the employer required the manager be notified if an absence was to be applied to the FMLA approved leave. In February 2010, the employee requested and was approved to work from home two and one-half days per week. Beginning in March 2010, the employee requested her employer allow her to use badgescans to clock-in, instead of checking in with her supervisor. That request was denied. In March 2010, the Human Resources Director of the employer told Plaintiff she would need to use her FMLA leave for the other half of each office day if she limited her office work to two half-days per week. The Director informed the employee her request did not meet the employer’s “business needs.” 

 

Thereafter, in March 2010, the employee was given a final written warning for arriving late eight times, ranging from seven to forty-two minutes. In May 2010, the Director requested information from the employee’s physician as to whether her illness met the ADA definition of disability, which was responded to on July 13, 2010. The employee’s physician suggested “a flexible work schedule that would allow her to work efficiently when she is doing well, but allowed for rest on bad days.” On the same day, the employer terminated the employee for her continued tardiness and failure to accurately report her work time.

 

Upon de novo review, the Court reasoned the employee was not a “qualified individual,” as regular attendance was an essential function of her job. Additionally, the Court reasoned the employee was not meeting her employer’s legitimate expectations, which was fatal to both her ADA claim and Title VII race discrimination claim. Finally, the Court reasoned the employer did not interfere with any FMLA rights of the employee as it continued to approve intermittent FMLA leave, while the employee failed to use her FMLA leave for the two half-days per week. The employer’s continuous and thorough documentation of its issues with the employee’s attendance was critically important to its defense. It continued to provide performance reviews throughout the employee’s employment documenting the employee’s marginal attendance and punctuality. Additionally, it documented the discrepancies between the employee’s alleged performance and audits of her performance.

 

At KCB&A, we encourage our clients to implement progressive disciplinary policies and to accurately document and review performance of their employees. As demonstrated in Taylor-Novotny, the accurate documentation of performance issues is essential to the defense of an employment discrimination claim.

 

The research and writing of this article was performed by Bradley J. Smith, J.D. Bradley can be reached with any questions regarding employment discrimination claims and any other general liability defense questions at bsmith@keefe-law.com.

 

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12-8-14; PART II Rising Min. Wage Bad for Jobs--Good for Your IL WC Claims; Brad Smith, JD Reviews Important ADA Win for Business; WCLA CLE Review by John Karis and much more

Synopsis: The IL Workers’ Comp Lawyers’ Ass’n Final 2014 CLE Presentation for the IL WC Industry. Thoughts and Analysis by John A. Karis JD.

 

Editor’s comment: On December 4, several crucial IL WC cases were presented by the great folks at WCLA in a continuing legal education format. Some of their key IL WC issues are discussed below. 

·         Fall down rulings compared

One of the cases discussed was Village of Villa Park, in which an employee, claimed he was injured while going down a flight of stairs in a police station. These stairs were only used by employees in the station and were not open to the public. Consequently there was no dispute on the question of whether his injury occurred “in the course of” his employment. The Appellate Court found falling while traversing stairs is a neutral risk and the injuries resulting therefrom generally do not arise out of employment. As with personal risks, the Court ruled compensability under the Act exists where the requirements of the Claimant’s employment create a risk to which the general public is not exposed. “The increased risk may be qualitative or quantitative such as where the claimant is exposed to a common risk more frequently than the general public.” Id.

 

The Arbitrator denied the claim stating the act of walking down stairs by itself did not establish a risk greater than those faced outside the work place. Thus, the Arbitrator concluded Claimant failed to prove his injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment. The Commission panel reversed the Arbitrator's decision, finding the event was “caused” by an accident. The Commission reasoned, at the time of the fall, Claimant's use of the stairs fell within the “personal comfort doctrine” and, therefore, arose out of and in the course of his employment. Further, the Commission concluded Claimant's necessary and repeated use the stairs for his employment exposed him to a greater risk than the general public.

 

The IL Appellate Court, agreed with the IWCC decision and found the injury was compensable. They believed the facts supported the Commission’s finding Claimant’s fall and resulting injury arose both out of and in the course of his employment and its holding in this regard was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The Appellate Court reasoned the evidence of record supported the Commission’s finding that the claimant was “continually forced to use the stairway” both for his personal comfort and “to complete his work related activities.” Specifically, the evidence established Claimant was required to traverse the stairs in the police station a minimum of six times per day. This fact coupled with evidence Claimant informed his superiors, prior to his fall, and his supervisor had seen him limping prior to the work event supported the inference the Village required the claimant to continuously traverse the stairs in the police station, knowing he had an injured knee.

 

We disagreed with this ruling when it was filed and continue to disagree respectfully with our peers at WCLA. We do not feel walking on stairs six times a day means Claimant was “forced” to do anything—he did his job and walked around his work station like thousands of workers do and that isn’t an unusual number of times to ascend and descend stairs to cause an increased risk.

 

Not All IL WC Fall Downs are Compensable

 

What if the claimant was injured walking down a hallway or other flat surface instead of stairs, would the injury still be compensable? Interestingly, the WCLA group discussed Julie Meierdirks  v. Northbrook School District #2 a case decided before Village of Villa Park. This case involved a teacher who fell while walking in a normal fashion without carrying any items and on what was termed by all parties as “industrial carpeting without defect.” The Arbitrator stated Petitioner did present any evidence to explain the cause of her fall. In fact, Petitioner stated she was not carrying any items in her hands nor was she walking at an increased rate. Therefore there was no evidence presented establishing a cause for the Petitioner’s fall which is the Petitioner’s burden in every case. The claim was denied and the decision became final.

 

·         Interstate Scaffolding/Matuszcsak is still out there

 

The defense attorneys in Matuszcsak v. IWCC have filed for a rehearing on this case and are awaiting results. The parties disagreed on whether the Commission utilized the correct legal analysis in vacating the arbitrator’s award of TTD following the Claimant’s termination from his employment for admitted theft. The Appellate Court held Claimant's for-cause termination, arising out of theft from employer, did not amount to refusal of light-duty work and thus did not provide basis for denial of TTD benefits.

 

The IL Appellate Court stated in their holding, per Interstate Scaffolding, the critical inquiry for the Commission when determining claimant's entitlement to TTD was whether his medical condition had stabilized and he had reached MMI. They ruled the Commission went beyond such considerations in vacating the Arbitrator's award of TTD and reversed to provide benefits. By this theory, anyone in light duty work can quit and still get benefits because almost all workers on restrictions are still under the care of a physician or other healthcare giver.

 

Please note our thought this ruling makes physician’s “off work” notes even more useless than in the past. We tell the attorneys on the other side and all claims handlers we never recommend paying any IL WC benefits based solely on a blind “off work” note from a doctor. If the legal standard above requires proof the worker needs continued medical attention and hasn’t reached MMI, a doctor can’t satisfy that standard simply by writing “off work” on a piece of paper and signing it.

 

This article was researched and written by John A. Karis, JD. The opinions John is voicing are his and not those of any member of WCLA or its board. John can be reached 24/7/365 for questions about WC at jkaris@keefe-law.com

 

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Synopsis: Quick Follow-up on Last Week’s Article about Refusing-to-Hire or Terminating Candidates/Workers with Criminal Convictions.

 

Editor’s comment: A number of readers asked about it and we have the answers as to what a federal “Statement of Rights” is if you don’t hire or actually fire someone with a prior criminal conviction.

 

“Statement of Rights” comes from the FRCA:

 

Under federal law, if an employer uses information from an investigative consumer report for an "adverse action" - that is, denying the job applicant, terminating the employee, rescinding a job offer, or denying a promotion - you must take the following steps, which are explained further in the Federal Trade Commission's web site, www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/business/credit/bus08.shtm

 

  • Before the adverse action is taken, the employer must give the applicant a "pre-adverse action disclosure." This includes a copy of the report and an explanation of the consumer's rights under the FCRA.
  • A summary of consumer rights under the FCRA can be found at: http://www.esrcheck.com/file/CFPB_Summary-of-Rights-Under-FCRA.pdf
  • After the adverse action is taken, the individual must be given an "adverse action notice." This document must contain

 

    • The name, address, and phone number of the employment screening company,
    • A statement this company did not make the adverse decision, rather that the employer did, and
    • A notice that the individual has the right to dispute the accuracy or completeness of any of the information in the report.

 

Modified disclosure and adverse action procedures under the FCRA (§604(b)(3)(B)) apply to positions subject to U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations such as truck drivers. The DOT has independent authority to set qualifications for workers in transportation industries. (49 USC §31502).

 

We caution all of our readers to grab your employment applications and see if you ask candidates about criminal convictions. If you do, get that out of there or you will soon be breaking the law! Our defense team at KCB&A is happy to assist with any issues.

 

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Synopsis: JC Johnson of Dorsett, Johnson & Swift, our favorite Texas defense partner.

 

Editor’s comment: We get asked all the time who the best Texas defense lawyer may be and our response is uniform—JC Johnson of Dorsett, Johnson & Swift. Unlike Illinois, the State of Texas is booming with almost 400,000 new jobs in the Lone Star State this past year. Texas is getting more new jobs in a single month than Illinois has developed in the last year. JC Johnson is our go-to guy for national and regional clients needing solid defense advice.

 

Serving in senior management executive roles in the insurance and real estate industries, as well as serving as legal counsel for numerous companies within those industries, JC Johnson has extensive knowledge of both the business and legal issues that face companies in the modern business environment. This understanding allows him to offer legal solutions that are efficient and effective. Mr. Johnson manages the real estate, title insurance and workers compensation divisions of Dorsett Johnson & Swift, LLP and supports the firm’s liability defense litigation division in the North Texas region.

 

Additionally, Mr. Johnson assists clients with commercial contracts, commercial collections, entity formation, employment issues and business litigation. He also serves the business community as a speaker and educator on topics of legal issues, risk management and litigation. They are a one-stop shop with defense coverage for virtually the entire states of Texas and Oklahoma.

 

His great website with photo, background and contact information is http://dorsettjohnson.com/attorneys/jcjohnson/.