2-3-14; Illinois Government--Corrupt, Crazy or Clunky?; Chris St. Peter Analyzes Your Duty to Remove Snow/Ice; Shawn Biery Outlines MSA Thresholds and more

Synopsis: Is The Current State of Illinois Government Corrupt, Crazy or Clunky? We Ask Our Readers to Decide.

 

Editor’s comment: Here are three completely odd scenarios that we encourage our readers, clients and other observers to consider. We feel they demonstrate why Illinois government is


ü  Corrupt—in short, stuff that appears crooked, questionable or criminal in nature; 

 

ü  Crazy—things that simply don’t make common sense and can’t be made to make sense; or

ü  Clunky—things that sort of make sense but are inefficient, ineffective and should clearly be greatly improved.

 

Scenario No. 1 – Giving $56,345.69 to Claimant and Her Attorney for a Workers’ Comp Claim Where OurAppellate Court Ruled She Isn’t Entitled to WC Benefits.

 

It is hard to write this stuff, folks. In Illinois State Treasurer v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, 2013 IL App (1st) 120549WC, our Appellate Court, WC Division considered a claim where Petitioner injured herself tying her own shoes. We don’t have any idea how that can be a workers’ comp “accidental injury” as it clearly is a risk common to the public. We don’t even know why an attorney would take such a claim. Petitioner was a home health care worker who was placed at the job by a service but the subject of her work passed during the pendency of the claim and the matter was taken up by the State Treasurer and AG Lisa Madigan’s office on behalf of the Injured Workers Benefits Fund that collects money for claimants injured working for uninsured employers.

 

The Arbitrator found accident for reasons we simply cannot understand. The IWCC affirmed without further comment. The Attorney General’s office filed an appeal to the Circuit and then Appellate Court, WC Division. On January 7, 2013, our penultimate reviewing court reversed the award of benefits and denied the claim. We salute them for adhering to well-established tenets of Illinois WC law. Sort of.

 

What then happens is Petitioner’s attorney files a petition for rehearing. In our experience, Petitions for Rehearing are granted by this panel about once every generation. It may have helped that Petitioner’s counsel is the Treasurer of the Working Forward PAC that legally donates substantial monies to Governor Quinn’s campaign.

 

On rehearing, the main issue appeared to be whether the Illinois State Treasurer needed to file an appeal bond. For reference, the unanimous opinion noted the statute says this about the need for an appeal bond:

 

Section 19(f)(2) provides…“[e]very county, city, town, township, incorporated village, school district, body politic or municipal corporation against whom the Commission shall have rendered an award for the payment of money shall not be required to file a bond.” 820 ILCS 305/19(f)(2) (West 2012).

 

With respect to the august members of this appellate panel, we feel there was lots of room for the Appellate Court, WC Division to rule the State Treasurer is a “body politic” and therefore exempt from filing an appeal bond. To the extent we treat all vendors and creditors poorly in IL government, the State would appear good for the money. We also point out the members of the Court are supposed to evaluate jurisdictional issues on their own—well-settled Illinois case law mandates our Circuit, Appellate or Supreme Courts are supposed to dismiss appeals on a sua sponte (or on their own motion) basis if there is no jurisdiction. We note this claim was pending before the five-member Appellate Court for around two years before they decided they should have had nothing to do with it.

 

What this ruling also points out is our IL legislature, in their infinite wisdom, grabbed/latched onto/snatched about $3.8M from the Insured Workers’ Benefit Fund basically leaving claimants who work for uninsured employers hung out to dry—claimants are only entitled to a pro rata share of benefits due when there isn’t enough money for them in the Fund.

 

So is this ruling:

 

ü  Corrupt?—While we don’t agree with the decision, we cannot view the decision as “corrupt”. We point out the members of this Appellate panel have the highest ethical, moral and legal standards. They are beyond reproach. The IL legislature, on the other hand, should be castigated for stealing money from this fund created for injured claimants to provide protection when their employers don’t have WC insurance coverage.

 

ü  Crazy?—We feel this appellate ruling is, for lack of a better word, odd. If Claimant truly isn’t entitled to these monies based on the January 7, 2013 ruling of this panel, it is wildly baffling to see her receive $56,345.69 as a gift from our State fund.

 

ü  Clunky?—On behalf of parties litigant on both sides of the WC matrix, we wish our Illinois state courts in situations such as this would first and foremost insure they have subject matter jurisdiction. For the claim to pend for two years to then find out nothing needed to be done on the merits of the appeal is, again in our respectful view, clunky.

 

Scenario No. 2 — Taking Money from the Poor to Benefit the Rich? Only in Illinois government!

 

As we have advised our readers on numerous occasions, Governor Quinn and state government unions unquestionably have a love-hate relationship. If you aren’t sure the impact of this tortured relationship caused government union workers to boo our Governor off the stage during his speech at the Illinois State Fair. In clear and almost immediate retaliation, Governor Quinn summarily fired an IL WC Arbitrator who was married to one of the state government union leaders involved in this embarrassing debacle. Ouch.

 

However, Governor Quinn repeatedly seeks IL government union support whenever and however he can. We recently heard Crooked Blago and later Governor Quinn penned executive orders relating to payment of Illinois State Medicaid benefits. If you or I were to have to quit our jobs and seek state aid to allow us to care for a seriously ill family member, these executive orders require you to join the union to pay dues or pay matching dues, even if you won’t be a union member.

 

From what we have read, there are about 20,000 Illinois citizens in this situation. The amount they will have to pay if the executive orders aren’t stricken by the United States Supreme Court is about $50 per month—if you do the math, the executive orders will effectively require these indigent Medicaid beneficiaries to kick $1,000,000 every month to the union that is the beneficiary of the orders. So let’s be clear, some of the poorest members of IL society who need state aid to care for their sick family members will now have $50 less each month—we ask you the rhetorical question “Isn’t that stealing from the poor to benefit wealthy union leaders?”

 

So are these executive orders:

 

ü  Corrupt?—From our perspective as government observers, it is hard to call this one. What do you think?

 

ü  Crazy?—Without question, we consider them crazy—should every IL citizen seeking money from our state be forced to join a union or make matching dues payments. Should unemployment compensation beneficiaries? How about the spouses of IL WC total and permanent disability claimants? How about college kids on scholarships? What is the conceivable basis to force Medicaid beneficiaries to give up their benefits and have to pay any portion to a union that does nothing for them?

 

ü  Clunky?—At a minimum, this is another example of clunky, junky, dysfunctional IL government. We are furious to see our Governor using our taxpayer dollars to fight for this silly concept all the way to our highest court.

 

Scenario No. 3 – As you read this, over a five-year period, 2,000 Illinois state government workers were off work with full pay awaiting decisions on their work status. Paid administrative leave for state employees in Illinois is supposed to be an "expeditious" process, according to the Governor's office. The Chicago Tribune reported how nutty the HR situation is by highlighting a state boxing official was paid to stay home for nearly 30 months while investigators examined allegations he used his position to benefit himself and his family. During this time, he received seven salary increases while not even working!

 

His case — highlighted in a Tribune investigation that showed the high cost to the state of such drawn-out cases — appears to be over. The state lost its fight to fire this official who returned to work in December 2013. You don’t have to be Warren Buffett or Donald Trump to figure if the State didn’t need this worker for 2-1/2 years, they probably don’t need that job at all and could eliminate it completely to save taxpayers the dough.

 

However this issue is exponentially bigger and demonstrates what a mess our state government is in. TheTribune reported in October 2012 that more than 2,000 state employees had been put on paid leave in the previous five years, collecting $23 million in wages. Nearly 70 employees spent more than a year on paid leave to the tune of $5 million in wasted taxpayer dollars. If you are doing the math, right now, about 1 in 30 Illinois government employees may be off work on full pay, awaiting resolution of interminable employment disputes. Can there be anything that more clearly demonstrates featherbedding and the fact we have way too many state workers?

 

What we also don’t understand is why/how any number of IL WC Arbitrators were summarily sacked when the IL WC Act supporting them was amended—when and how do the “paid leave” rights arise and why didn’t the Arbitrators get that magic bubble with pay?

 

When one considers there are lots and lots of state government workers’ comp “odd-lot” total and permanent disability claimants who could be returned to work at alternative jobs along with police/firefighters who are paid lifetime line-of-duty disability pensions despite being able to work other jobs along with thousands of state workers on indefinite paid leave, you start to see why things under this administration are

 

ü  Corrupt?—This one isn’t truly corrupt that we can tell but it stinks like it is.

 

ü  Crazy?—We consider these sorts of shenanigans to be impossibly crazy. Our effectively-bankrupt state has to have a better system for handling HR. No private organization and most governments across the U.S. would pay for 1 in 30 workers to remain off duty with full pay indefinitely.

 

ü  Clunky?—See “crazy” above.

 

We appreciate your thoughts and comments. Please post them on our award-winning blog.

 

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Synopsis: Do Illinois Businesses Have a Duty to Remove Snow and Ice? An overview of premises liability law by KCB&A’s general liability team leader Chris St. Peter, J.D.

Editor’s comment: The snow just keeps falling in the Chicagoland area. Accordingly, we thought it would be a good time to inform our readers of some basic elements of premises liability law, particularly when snow and ice are involved. This analysis focuses on businesses open to the public—that is, businesses that allow customers, contractors, vendors, and others to lawfully enter their premises.

I.              Overview of Illinois Premises Liability Law

As a general matter, slip and fall cases are governed by the Illinois Premises Liability Act. See 740 ILCS 130/1 et seq. (West 2000). Under the Premises Liability Act, the owner or lessee of a premises owes a duty of “reasonable care under the circumstances” to those lawfully on the premises. Simmons v. Am. Drug Stores, Inc., 329 Ill. App. 3d 38, 43 (1st Dist. 2002). In other words, a business must maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition, or it could face liability for any injuries caused by those conditions.

II.            Snow and Ice Removal

 

A.   Natural-Accumulation Rule

 

Illinois law is generally favorable to businesses when dealing with snow and ice. For example, under what is known as the “natural-accumulation rule,” a business does not have a duty to remove natural accumulations of snow or ice from its propertyThis rule was adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court in the 1931 case ofGraham v. City of Chicago, 346 Ill. 638 (1931). In Graham, the plaintiff sued the City of Chicago when she slipped and fell on a patch of ice that had formed on a city sidewalk. The Illinois Supreme Court held it would be “unreasonable to compel a city to expend the money and perform the labor necessary to keep its walks reasonably free from ice and snow during winter months.” Id. at 643.

 

The natural-accumulation rule has been expanded over the years to provide broad protections to Illinois businesses, as well as cities and municipalities. For example, even if the snow and ice remain on the property for an “unreasonable” length of time, it has been held that no liability will be imposed as long as the snow and ice is a natural accumulation. See, e.g., Kellerman v. Car City Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc., 306 Ill. App. 3d 285, 288 (1999). Thus, snow that has fallen and collected, sleet or freezing rain that forms ice, or melting snow that re-freezes into ice may remain upon a business’s premises without liability for falls.

 

In addition, Illinois courts have applied the natural-accumulation rule to all types of businesses (e.g., gas stations, hotels, restaurants, shopping malls, etc.), as well as all areas of a business’s property (e.g., on the sidewalk, in the parking lot, inside the store, or on the step of an entranceway).

 

It should be noted that a contract or a lease agreement requiring snow removal can create a duty to remove natural accumulations. See, e.g., Schoondyke v. Heil, Heil, Smart & Golee, Inc., 89 Ill. App. 3d 640 (1st Dist. 1980). However, while such a contract may create a duty of snow removal, it does not establish a strict liability standard. In other words, the plaintiff must still prove the business knew or should have known of the dangerous condition and failed to take proper steps to guard against it.

 

B.   Unnatural Accumulation

 

As outlined above, Illinois businesses have no general duty to remove natural accumulations of snow and ice on their property, nor will they face liability for falls resulting from such natural accumulations. However, if there is an "unnatural accumulation" of ice or snow created by the snow removal process—for example, a mound where the ice or snow was pushed—then there may be liability for the fall. Stated differently, in order for a business to be liable for a slip and fall on snow or ice, the business must be shown to have in some way caused an unnatural accumulation of ice or snow, or to have somehow aggravated a natural conditionFurther, notice of an unnatural accumulation of snow or ice is required to impose liability upon the landowner or occupier.

 

 

Recovery for falls on icy sidewalks or parking lots can also be based on negligent design or maintenance of the underlying pavement which causes an unnatural accumulation to form. For example, a business can be liable for falls caused by the sloping surface of a parking lot which alters the normal runoff and creates an icy surface.   

 

Of note, Illinois courts have repeatedly held that application of salt by a business, causing ice to melt and refreeze, does not aggravate the natural accumulation already present. See, e.g., Harkins v. System Parking, Inc., 186 Ill. App. 3d 869, 873 (1989).

 

C.   Residential Landowners

 

As an aside, Illinois law holds that residential landowners are only liable for willful and wanton misconduct in the removal of ice or snow. The relevant Illinois statute states:

 

Any owner, lessor, occupant or other person in charge of any residential property . . . who removes or attempts to remove snow or ice from sidewalks abutting the property shall not be liable for any personal injuries allegedly caused by the snowy or icy condition of the sidewalk resulting in his or her acts or omissions unless the alleged misconduct was willful or wanton.

 

745 ILCS 75/2. This “willful or wanton” standard makes slip and fall cases against residential landowners difficult to prove.

 

III.           Conclusion

 

To summarize, a business that allows the public to lawfully enter its property does not have a duty to remove natural accumulations of snow and icebut if you voluntarily choose to do so, you better do it right or you could face liability. This means being cautious not to create any “unnatural accumulations” that did not exist prior to the removal process. Of course, the question of what constitutes an “unnatural accumulation” is a difficult one and is often the key inquiry in any resulting litigation.  

This article was researched and written by Chris St. Peter, J.D. and your editor. Please feel free to provide your thoughts and comments to Chris at cstpeter@keefe-law.com.

 

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Synopsis: Losing Your Mind over Medicare Issues related to litigation? A primer by Shawn R. Biery for knowing when to report the claim and when CMS will actually tell you if your MSA is appropriate.

 

Editor’s comment: We remain inundated with questions regarding Medicare issues as settlements are being completed and even now as small mostly medical claims are opened and closed. The rules continue to change and in an effort to keep up with the changes, we again remind you, first and foremost—ALWAYS CONSIDER MEDICARE’S INTERESTS.

 

 

In that regard, you must always consider whether Medicare may be asked to make some payment which could be considered related to your claim.

 

  • If you have a strong end of care statement from a primary treating MD, mention that in the settlement documents as the reason you are not adding value for future medical.
  • If there is no definitive end of care confirmation, identify a value to allow the injured individual to cover potential costs and include that value in your settlement.
  • CMS will only review your proposal if:
    • The settlement exceeds $25,000 and the individual is already eligible for Medicare, or
    • The settlement exceeds $250,000 and the individual has a reasonable expectation to be eligible for Medicare within the next 30 months
      • Reasonable expectation can include being over 62.5 yrs of age, having already applied for SSDI, having end-stage renal failure/

 

Please remember that just because a threshold for review by CMS as noted above is not met—it does NOT mean you don’t have the obligation to consider the “reasonable expectation” of future care payable by Medicare.

 

How you ask will Medicare know if the claim exists?  Section 111 Medicare Secondary Payer (MSP) reporting requirements make you tell them! 

 

They use terms such as TPOC (Total Payment Obligation to Claimant), ORM (Ongoing Responsibility for Medicals) and NGHP (non-group health plan).

 

  • The total payment obligation is defined by CMS as "...the Total Payment Obligation to the Claimant without regard to ongoing medical services," but it is probably easier in many disputed cases to think of it as the final settlement amount regardless of what had been paid up until that point. (THAT DOESN’T HELP MUCH IN DECIDING WHAT TO REPORT, DOES IT?)
  • If you are a workers’ compensation plan, a liability plan, or a self-insurance plan, you are a NGHP.
  • If future medical care is necessary,  there is Ongoing Responsibility for Medicals.

 

When do you need to report the claim for liability claims (not WC)?

 

  • For dates between October 1, 2012 and September 30, 2013, reporting should have taken place if the cumulative TPOC Amount was greater than $5,000.
  • Currently if a claim has a total payment obligation to the claimant (TPOC) over $2,000, you should be reporting that claim. This will continue for dates between October 1, 2013 and September 30, 2014 where you have a cumulative TPOC Amount greater than $2,000.
  • As of October 1, 2014, reporting must take place if the cumulative TPOC Amount is greater than $300 and that threshold is currently set out indefinitely.
  • Responsible Reporting Entities are required to report workers’ compensation ORM which exists on or through January 1, 2010, regardless of the date of an initial acceptance of payment responsibility. The interim thresholds do not apply to workers’ compensation ORM. However, certain workers’ compensation ORM claims are excluded from reporting if they meet ALL of the following criteria:

 

  • the claim is for “medicals only”;
  • the associated “lost time” for the worker is no more than the number of days permitted by the applicable workers' compensation law for a “medicals only” claim (or 7 calendar days if the applicable law has no such limit);
  • all payments have been made directly to the medical provider;
  • and the total payment for medicals does not exceed $750.

 

Please note—once a workers’ compensation ORM claim is excluded from reporting, it does not need to be reported unless the circumstances change such that it no longer meets the interim exclusion criteria listed. (Basically the claim does not need to be reported unless something other than medicals is included, there is more lost time, a payment is made to someone other than a provider, and/or payments for medicals exceed $750).

 

The best way to make sense of all of this is to err on the side of caution and report the claim if you are unsure and as noted above ALWAYS CONSIDER MEDICARE’S INTERESTS and make sure you confirm in any settlement documents how you protected their interests. This article was researched and written by Shawn R. Biery J.D., MSCC and he can be reached at 312-756-3701 or sbiery@keefe-law.com. Both Shawn and Matt Ignoffo J.D., MSCC at mignoffo@keefe-law.com  are certified MSA consultants in our office who are prepared to field any questions you may have.

 

1-27-14; Update Your IL WC Rates With Shawn's Great Sheet; Big Appellate Win, Analysis by Arik Hetue; Lemon Law Analysis by Chris St. Peter and more

Synopsis: Illinois WC Rates Jump Again and Your PPD Reserves Need Retroactive Updating. Send a Reply to Get a Free Copy of Shawn R. Biery’s Updated IL WC Rate-Sheet!

 

Editor’s comment: We remain chagrined to continue to watch the endless spiral of IL WC rates. Starting in the 1980’s, the IL WC Act provides a formula which effectively insures no matter how poor the IL economy is doing, our WC rates keep climbing.

 

We caution our readers to pay attention to the fact the IL WC statutory maximum PPD rate is now $721.66. When it was published, this rate changed retroactively from July 1, 2013 to presentIf you reserved a claim based on the prior rate for the period from July 1 to right now, your reserves are wrong.If you have a claim with a date of loss after July 2013 and a max PPD rate, you need to take a look and see if the new maximum PPD rate applies. If this isn’t clear, send a reply. 

 

The current TTD weekly maximum has risen to $1,336.91. A worker has to make over $2,005.36 per week or $104,278.98 per year to hit the new IL WC maximum TTD rate. Do such folks truly need full TTD value? Does any state in the United States have a TTD maximum that high?

 

The new IL WC minimum death benefit is 25 years of compensation or $501.34 per week x 52 weeks in a year x 25 years or $651,742.00! The new maximum IL WC death benefit is $1,336.91 times 52 weeks times 25 years or a lofty $1,737,983.00 plus burial benefits of $8K.

 

The best way to make sense of all of this is to get Shawn Biery’s colorful, updated and easy-to-understand IL WC Rate Sheet. If you want it, simply reply to Shawn at sbiery@keefe-law.com and he will get a copy routed to you before they raise the rates again!

 

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Synopsis: KCB&A gets a big win at the IL Appellate Court, Workers’ Comp Division; with an in-depth look at the form and function of the IL Supreme Court Rule 23 Order.

 

Editor’s comment: You have heard us discuss what we feel is the dreaded Rule 23 Gag or “Unpublished” Appellate Court Order in the past with some harsh criticism, but most of the time, and especially in recent courtroom opinions, we feel it is used the right way. We provide a little detail over one of our most recent victories, and a bit of exposition on the status of the court’s use of the Rule 23 order.

 

In Glass v. YRCthis firm defended one of the nation’s largest trucking organizations. At the initial Arbitration hearing, Petitioner was awarded benefits and a prospective lumbar fusion surgery. The facts of the claim were not wholly one sided though, and on appeal at the IWCC, the Commission agreed with a multitude of arguments made by Arik Hetue in his appeal of the Arbitrator’s decision. Ultimately, the IWCC Commissioners ruled Petitioner suffered a temporary aggravation of a pre-existing condition, and confirmed the prospective surgery was not causally related to the work injury. On appeal at the Circuit and Appellate Courts, the IWCC decision was affirmed. If you would like to review a copy of the recent Appellate Court order, send a reply and we can forward you a copy. It sounds a bit like a run of the mill case, but we assure you there was a lot of medical care and a potential wage differential award hanging in the balance. What the case lets us do however is explore two very important concepts – the manifest weight of the evidence standard, and the Rule 23 Order.

 

In Glass the facts were up in the air and the case really could have gone either way – as evidenced by the Arbitrator awarding benefits and the Commission reversing and awarding some benefits but confirming the medical care at issue was not related. While all defense victories are a joy to a defense attorney, in this line of business, the Commission appeal level is the one you want to win. As we have discussed ad nauseum in the past, the Commission gets to look at everything with a fresh set of eyes and draw its own conclusions – it is not required to give any weight or deference to the Arbitrator’s findings. The legal term of art for this standard is “de novo”, and it allows the Commission to revisit the facts and come to a different conclusion than the Arbitrator did.

 

Why is this the level we are so pleased to win at? Once a case moves from the IWCC to the Circuit Court – the facts are “locked in” and any reviewing court can only come to a different factual finding if the facts are “against the manifest weight of the evidence.” That means the opposite conclusion has to be clearly apparent – it’s the kind of thing that happens rarely, or that is supposed to happen rarely. InGlass the Circuit Court judge clearly outlined his opinion that while the facts in a case can go either way, he is forbidden to substitute his view of them for the Commission’s. We agree and feel that is right in line with the appropriate legal standard. We were extremely pleased to see the IL WC Appellate Court agree and issue a simple ruling in the form of the Rule 23 Order.

 

A Rule 23 Order is an unpublished opinion – it’s meant to be used in cases like this one, where there is no significant controversy or groundbreaking ruling that may require publishing the opinion such that others could rely on the Court’s statements in other similar circumstances. We have complained bitterly in the past in this KCB&A Update over cases that were decided under this type or order which had what seemed like far-reaching impactive statements by the court.

 

Well, it appears they got the message, as we have recently performed a review of all of the Rule 23 orders from the past 6 months. Not a single such order was used in a case where there was what we feel to be a statement or ruling that should have been published. Bully for you, Appellate Court Justices! We hope they continue to keep using this order in the manner it was intended for, and continue to publish those rulings that have more far reaching statements. 

 

This article was researched and written by Arik D. Hetue, J. D. who can be reached at ahetue@keefe-law.comfor comment.

 

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Synopsis: Warranty Law—What Can You Do If You Bought a Piece of Junk? Analysis by KCB&A’s top GL/Warranty defense team member Chris St. Peter, J.D.

Editor’s comment: We want our readers to know what rights are available to consumers who purchase any new products that don’t work as intended or otherwise fail to comply with an express warranty. Our readers should also be aware of these laws from a defense perspective, as these consumer protection cases can be difficult and costly to defend due to statutory fee-shifting provisions and a strong public policy favoring consumer rights.

To this end, below is an overview of breach of express warranty claims under both federal and Illinois law.Please note that while these protections can apply to vehicles, Illinois also has a separate “Lemon Law” statute, 815 ILCS 380/1 et seq., which is not analyzed here.

I.              Federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act

 

A.   Background

 

Breach of warranty claims are governed by the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq. (1994)). The Magnuson-Moss Act allows consumers to file a lawsuit to recover damages resulting from a breach of a written warranty. As an Illinois court explained, “The Act provides a private right of action by a consumer purchaser of a consumer product against a manufacturer or retailer failing to comply with the Act or the terms of a written warranty arising therefrom.” Hasek v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 319 Ill. App. 3d 780, 793 (1st Dist. 2001). A consumer alleging a violation of the Act may file a lawsuit in any state court. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1)(A). If the amount in controversy is over $50,000 (exclusive of interest, fees, or costs), the consumer may file suit in federal court. Id. § 2310(d)(3)(B).

 

The Act applies to the sale of any written warranty on a consumer product (or services in connection with that product) costing more than $10. See 16 C.F.R. § 700.1(g), (h). The definition of “consumer product” includes automobile-related products. Id. § 700.1(a). The Act defines a “written warranty” as:

 

(A) any written affirmation of fact or written promise made in connection with the sale of a consumer product by a supplier to a buyer which relates to the nature of the material or workmanship and affirms or promises that such material or workmanship is defect free or will meet a specified level of performance over a specified period of time, or

 

(B) any undertaking in writing in connection with the sale by a supplier of a consumer product to refund, repair, replace, or take other remedial action with respect to such product in the event that such product fails to meet the specifications set forth in the undertaking.

 

15 U.S.C. § 2301(6). Thus, for example, the Magnuson-Moss Act can apply to written warranties guaranteeing the consumer’s “satisfaction“ or that  the product “will be free from defects in materials or workmanship” for a certain time period.

 

B.   Elements of a Claim

 

To state a claim for breach of written warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Act, a plaintiff must prove: (1) there was a defect in the product; (2) the defect was covered by the warranty’s terms; (3) a demand for cure was made; and (4) the defendant either refused or was unable to cure the defect.  Hasek v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 319 Ill. App. 3d 780, 794 (1st Dist. 2001).

 

C.   Available Damages

 

The measure of damages in a breach of warranty claim are calculated based upon the sum of money that would put the plaintiff in as good a position as he or she would have been in if the defendant had performed all its promises under the warranty, as well as any reasonably related incidental and consequential damages. See Ill. Pattern Jury Instructions, IPI 185.09, 185.12 (2007). These damages can include the cost of repairs, aggravation and inconvenience, and diminished value of the product. See, e.g., Razor v. Hyundai Motor Am., 222 Ill. 2d 75, 83  (2006) (awarding $5,000 in warranty damages for the diminished value of Plaintiff’s car and $3,500 in consequential damages for aggravation and inconvenience and loss of use).

 

In addition—and most notably—the Act permits recovery of attorney’s fees. See 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2). Moreover, attorney’s fees can be awarded which are not proportionate to the amount at stake. See, e.g., Cannon v. William Chevrolet, 341 Ill. App. 3d 674, 686 (1st Dist. 2003) (“the award of attorney fees does not depend upon a plaintiff's recovery of substantial monetary damages nor does it need to be proportionate to an award of money damages”). Thus, a relatively small warranty claim can result in a large award due to the amount of attorney’s fees incurred.

 

II.            Illinois Breach of Warranty Claim under Uniform Commercial Code

 

A.   Background

 

Illinois has a separate cause of action for breach of warranty claims, which is governed by the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”). See 810 ILCS 5/1-101, et seq. As a threshold matter, however, the UCC only applies to the sale of goods, not the sale of services.  Id. § 5/2-102. Where there is a mixed contract for goods and services, the UCC only applies if the sale is predominantly for goods and incidentally for services.  Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 352-53 (2002). When presented with a mixed contract, the court will make a finding of whether the sale is predominately for goods or services, thus determining coverage under the UCC. See, e.g., Brandt v. Boston Scientific Corp., 204 Ill. 2d 640, 654 (2003) (transaction between hospital and patient involving surgical implantation of medical device was predominantly for services, and incidentally for purchase of goods, such that UCC did not apply).   

 

B.   Elements of a Claim

 

The elements of a breach of express warranty claim under the UCC are effectively the same as the elements under the federal Magnuson-Moss Act. See Hasek v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 319 Ill. App. 3d 780, 794 (1st Dist. 2001). However, under the UCC, a plaintiff must also show the seller’s warranty formed part of the basis of the bargain. Wheeler v. Sunbelt Tool Co., 181 Ill. App. 3d 1088, 1100 (1989). Stated differently, the warranty must be a basic assumption of the parties’ agreement.

 

C.   Available Damages

A buyer may recover all losses “resulting in the ordinary course of events from the seller’s breach as determined in any manner which is reasonable.” 810 ILCS 5/2-714(1). This includes incidental and consequential damages.Id. § 5/2-715(2)(b). Thus, the damages are the same as those available under the federal Magnuson-Moss Act, with the notable exception that attorney’s fees are not recoverable under the UCC.  

In summary, the above two warranty statutes provide strong protections for consumers—and in the case of the federal Magnuson-Moss Act, a fee-shifting provision—that can make defense of such lawsuits challenging and costly. There are also a myriad of other potentially applicable consumer protection, product liability, breach of contract, and other laws that are outside the scope of this analysis. We ask our readers to contact us with any questions or concerns about how these laws might apply to them as a consumer or to their business as a manufacturer or retailer.  

This article was researched and written by Chris St. Peter, J.D. and your editor. Please feel free to provide your thoughts and comments to Chris at cstpeter@keefe-law.com.

1-20-14; When Do We Reach Out to Bruce Rauner?; GL Settlements Move to the Fast Lane, Analysis by Chris St. Peter; Federal Magistrate's Ruling May Herald Change in Attorney-Client Privilege and more

Synopsis: When Does the IL WC Community Reach Out to Bruce Rauner?

 

Editor’s comment: We met with IL Gubernatorial candidate Bruce Rauner last week to discuss the role workers’ compensation will hold for his administration if he is elected governor—we were greatly impressed with this political neophyte and hard-working businessman. As you read this, Mr. Rauner has a commanding lead over the other three candidates for the Republican spot in the general election. The primary is set for March 18, 2014 and barring some major change, Rauner is almost certain to swamp his other primary rivals.

 

In a head-to-head battle with incumbent Governor Quinn, Bruce Rauner also appears to compare very favorably. Pat Quinn’s current voter approval rating is at a record low. We strongly suspect any Republican opponent will repeatedly point out Pat Quinn was Blago’s Lieutenant Governor and apparently didn’t know or perhaps want to know or care about what was happening in Springfield during those dark years. The recent circus about IL gov’t pension reforms is completely unpredictable and only addressed 4 of the 5 state pension programs. The proposed pension changes don’t start until June 2014 and even that may be delayed/rejected, as no one has any idea if the courts will uphold the law. IL Judges/justices pensions weren’t touched and their “pensions” or lifetime post-employment income from you could pay them as much as $1M per year of service, if they plan it right (if you don’t believe this one, send a reply and we will explain). The only things you can be sure of are Pat Quinn has been in IL state government since 1990, our current pension deficit is over $100B and the deficit keeps inexorably rising by several million dollars every day. While we applaud our Governor for his work to get whatever slim and slippery reforms that might stick in the face of staunch union opposition, none of it sounds like much in the way of effective and lasting “pension reform” to us. Only in Illinois can you see the absurd paradox of IL state government unions fighting, screaming and suing the Governor over these reforms while simultaneously giving him millions in campaign cash to avoid a great manager like Bruce Rauner!

 

The Illinois Governor Has to Worry about Three Different WC Issues

A.   Illinois Workers’ Compensation Benefits, B. The IWCC—Our State Agency That Administers Them and C. State Government Workers’ WC Claims

 

On the workers’ compensation front, in 2002 Blago traded control of the good ole Industrial Commission to the Plaintiff bar from Madison County, IL. As fast as they got in, they changed the name and funding of the place and the cost of Illinois WC benefits went out of sight—IL went from the middle of the U.S. to the top five. As our second-in-command in state government at the time, one would have thought Quinn would have voiced at least some concern about the enormous change this caused in our business climate. At the time, we don’t remember Pat Quinn making a peep about the drastic changes to the IWCC. It is difficult for us to believe the Governor is now suddenly more concerned about Illinois competitive advantage (or lack thereof) as it relates to the Workers’ Compensation Commission. We do agree Governor Quinn got involved and was part of the genesis of the 2011 Amendments to the IL WC Act.

 

Illinois Workers’ Compensation Benefits

 

In covering the 2011 Amendments to the IL WC Act, we note they have been in place for about 28 months from the September 1, 2011 effective date. The jury is still out on the overall WC benefit savings. It seemed to take years to put the biggest cost-saving tool, WC PPP’s into place. We consider the delays inexcusable. WCRI and national sources do indicate enormous savings have been made in cutting rising IL WC medical costs but the total savings are still in question. On the judicial side, we have watched our “activist” reviewing courts issue many odd, unprecedented and arguably inexplicable WC rulings that one can’t blame on the Governor or his team. However, some of these controversial appellate rulings were affirmations of earlier decisions from the IWCC Commissioners who are appointed by the Governor.

 

The IWCC—Our State Agency That Administers WC Benefits

 

While we feel the Workers’ Compensation Commission remains somewhat “creative” or controversial and appear to sometimes circumvent the statute in relation to the facts, we must acknowledge, as Governor Quinn began to take an active role at the IWCC, we do agree Chairman Latz, the nine Commissioners and our Arbitration staff have become more middle-of-the-road and now reach high professional standards. We don’t agree the IWCC’s rising budget at a cost of about $30M per year matches the dramatic drop in Illinois WC claims. It appears no matter how many or few hearing officers are at the IWCC, IL WC claims still move at a relative snail’s pace in relation to our sister states. In our view, while professionalism is much stronger, there have been few demonstrable cost-saving administrative efficiencies at the IWCC under Governor Quinn.

 

State Government Workers’ WC Claims

 

Please also remember State of IL government is one of the biggest employers in the state. In our view, our state governments’ own workers’ compensation claims handling system remains a complete mess and is still paying something like $100M per year in runaway workers’ comp benefits. The 2011 Amendments to the IL WC Act created the State Workers’ Compensation Advisory Board that you can find online if you dig a little. In our view, this Board is another one of those IL Gov’t boards created solely for outward appearances and to hand out nifty board membership plaques. We were recently advised there is an ongoing feud between the CMS managers who were “sort-of” replaced by the West Coast TPA brought in to handle State Employee claims. From a management perspective we consider it comical to replace the state adjusters with outside private adjusters and not get rid of the state employees who you have replaced! Both sides are now fighting over control of the WC claims, including battles about choice of vendors and when to cut off and dispute benefits. We still note the U. of IL Hospital in Chicago is still being “defended” by a successful Plaintiff lawyer! None of these changes have resulted in efficiencies or lower payouts that we can tell. We are sure many of the silly carpal tunnel claims by key-turning prison guards have been routinely denied and that is a good thing. In the bigger picture, all of appears ineffective and appears embarrassing to our Governor and his administration.

 

We were also advised thousands of state workers still enjoy “odd-lot” permanent and total disability benefits that are effectively “pensions” with guaranteed COLA increases paid for by Illinois business. We were advised the cost of those lifetime benefits on an annual basis is well over $10M that could be immediately saved if the state would locate sedentary or light work when they have openings for the claimants. The reason no one beefs about it is because the workers love to get paid as if they are working but don’t have to—they aren’t going to complain. Like lots of things with our state government, no one is watching out for taxpayers, particularly if the media doesn’t know enough to beef about it. We would applaud a state-wide investigation similar to that executed in New York, where dozens of government workers were nabbed for their disingenuous and similarly specious claims for total disability.

 

Anyone Remember AG Madigan’s and State Auditor Holland’s Blistering Critiques in 2012?—In Our View, There Was No Effective Response/Reform from the Current Governor or His Administration To Most of the Issues

 

Please note these problems were chronicled to some extent in a blistering WC report in March 2012 by IL Attorney General Lisa Madigan. The Attorney General's report contained a raft of policy recommendations aimed at tightening up the claims process to make it more straightforward and consistent. IL State Auditor General William Holland's office also threw its weight behind the idea of reform, revealing from 2007-2010, Illinois paid out $295 million on the advice of claims adjusters with caseloads exponentially higher than the industry standard. In our view, Governor Quinn has done almost nothing in what is almost two years to effectively address AG Madigan’s or Auditor General Holland’s many valid concerns. AG Madigan’s report is online here:http://ilchamber.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Workers-Compensation-analysis-and-recommendations-4-12.pdf

 

Either way, from the most impartial of perspectives, the main metrics of record high taxes and highway tolls, billions in unpaid state bills, 48th worst among all states’ unemployment stats and a generally rotten business climate aren’t going to bode well for candidate Pat Quinn. As we indicate above, his main support is from our wealthy state government union leaders who want to keep your taxes and highway tolls sky-high and appear unconcerned about a bad business climate so long as their union members keep getting a hefty cut of the pie. We were also stunned to hear IL Senate President Cullerton tell the media last October our state can’t go “bankrupt” despite not being able to pay bills timely but we are certain to raise and raise taxes—most taxpayers don’t like to hear that news, particularly after being hit with the highest income tax increase in IL history when many better-run states don’t even have an income tax.

 

We Don’t Recommend the WC Community, Particularly Business Participants Ignore Bruce Rauner

 

He may be the immovable force or the irresistible object. The current administration enacted legislation to give our Governor full control of all IWCC positions and whoever gets the Governor job this fall should get control of the CMS team that is managing the State Workers’ Compensation Board. With that power comes a strong ability to change things for the better.

 

Our concern for IL workers’ comp participants is insuring candidate Bruce Rauner has some strong idea of what he is getting into and where he can take the three facets of this important system. We don’t want him to “throw out the Commission with the bath water” if he ends up taking over the reins of IL government in early 2015. We hope Bruce Rauner will be in touch with IL State Senator Matt Murphy along with DuPage County Board Chairman Dan Cronin who are both veteran and knowledgeable workers’ compensation system members. Outgoing IL Chamber President Doug Whitley and his legislative gurus should be another important stop for candidate Bruce Rauner. We also support the candidacy of Attorney Dan Ugaste who is a long-time IL WC defense lawyer who is running on the Republican side for state rep in the 65th District—we hope Dan is able to provide input to candidate Bruce Warner later this year. If you want to help Dan with his campaign, as we have, please send a reply.

 

We are sure our IL Plaintiff Bar is going to side with the incumbent and treat the challenger as a pariah. Our advice to them and all of our readers, clients and business leaders is we will be much better served to at least reach out to Bruce Rauner to insure he understands the nuances and needs of our WC system and brings the needed efficiencies to the debate and possibly, his future administration. Everyone’s goal should be having better state government in Illinois.

 

We appreciate your thoughts and comments. Please post them on our award-winning blog.

 

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Synopsis: Illinois GL Settlements Move to the Fast Lane—What Every Illinois Defendant and GL Claims Adjuster Needs to Know. Analysis by Chris St. Peter, J.D.

Editor’s comment: Claims and risk managers can’t ignore this one! A new Illinois law effective January 1, 2014 requires certain types of general liability settlements to be finalized and paid in a short timeframe. We want to ensure our clients are prepared to comply with the new law and avoid the statutory penalties. At a minimum, every Illinois general liability, WC and Employment Practices defendant and adjuster needs to know the following:

  1. The new statute applies to settlements reached in cases involving personal injury, property damage, wrongful death, or tort actions involving claims for money damages.
  2. The settling defendant or its adjuster must tender a release to the plaintiff within 14 days of written confirmation of the settlement.
  3. The setting defendant or its adjuster must pay all sums due to the plaintiff within 30 days after the plaintiff tenders the necessary settlement documents (e.g., executed release, dismissal order, and/or signed release of liens).
  4. If the settling defendant or its adjuster fail to comply with the statute, a judgment will be entered for the amount of settlement, with interest from the date the settlement was reached.
  5. Settling parties may contract around the statute by agreeing to other terms. We strongly recommend every applicable settlement agreement include alternative deadlines and/or an express waiver of the new statute.

If you want to learn more about this important new law, read on.

Background: 735 ILCS 5/2-2301 (eff. Jan. 1, 2014) Requires Rapid Payment of Certain Types of Settlements

On August 26, 2013, Gov. Quinn signed into law Public Act 098-0548, which creates a new statutory section addressing settlements and liens in civil cases other than workers’ comp. The new statute, 735 ILCS 5/2-2301 (Section 2301), provides deadlines for exchanging settlement documents with rapid payment after a civil matter is “settled.” The section imposes penalties upon settling defendants and their adjusters, including entry of judgment and costs, if the settling defendant does not comply with the deadlines set forth in the statute.

The statute went into effect for settlements on or after January 1, 2014. Your GL claims handling has to adjust to avoid unhappy surprises.

Section 2301 applies to settlements reached in cases involving personal injury, property damage, wrongful death, or tort actions involving claims for money damages. The statute does not apply to certain entities, such as the State of Illinois, state agencies, state employees, municipalities, and local governments. Additionally, the statute does not apply to class action lawsuits. We also note the statute does not apply to workers’ compensation settlements, and it is unlikely to apply to release/resignations negotiated as part of workers’ compensation settlements, as such agreements involve the plaintiff forgoing any civil cause of action related to the work injury. However, the contours and applicability of the new statute have yet to be addressed by the courts.

Section 2301 creates two main requirements for settling defendants and their adjusters:

First, it requires a settling defendant or its adjuster to tender a release to the plaintiff within 14 days of written confirmation of the settlement. Written confirmation includes all communication by written means. “Tender” is defined as “personal delivery or delivery by a means providing a return receipt.”

Second, the settling defendant is now required to pay all sums due to the plaintiff within 30 days after the plaintiff tenders certain settlement documents. These include:

  • The executed release,
  • A copy of the order approving settlement (if applicable), and
  • Signed releases of liens or other writings addressing handling of liens.

Penalties: Immediate and Collectible Judgment Against Defendant for the Amount of the Settlement Plus Interest and Costs

The new rule provides if, after a hearing, a court finds timely payment has not been made by the defendant or its adjuster, “judgment shall be entered against that defendant for the amount set forth in the executed release, plus costs incurred in obtaining the judgment,” plus interest, calculated from the date of tender. This means that if the defendant or its adjuster provides the settlement draft one day after the 30-day deadline, 31 days’ interest is added to the settlement amount, plus any costs the plaintiff incurred in obtaining the judgment.

Interestingly, while the statute imposes deadlines upon Defendants, no deadlines for the execution of signed releases and other documents are imposed upon Plaintiffs. For example:

  • If a settlement requires court approval, or if a lien-adjudication hearing is necessary, the plaintiff has no deadline to schedule these hearings.
  • If additional time is necessary to negotiate with a lien holder, the plaintiff has no deadline to complete these negotiations.

 

The statute also addresses how a settling plaintiff can protect a third-party’s right to recovery or subrogation interest, including liens by attorneys, healthcare providers, and insurance companies. In such cases the plaintiff may protect the third-party's interests by tendering to the defendant one of several different kinds of written communications putting the defendant on notice of the third-party claims. The communications named in the statute include a signed release of a lien held by an attorney or healthcare provider; a letter from the plaintiff's lawyer agreeing to hold the full amount of the settlement funds in a client trust account pending final resolution of the lien; an offer that the defendant hold the full amount claimed by the third party pending resolution on that matter; or several other written promises with how the parties will handle the money properly.

While the new statute is designed to expedite payment of settlements, the statute will likely have the unintended consequence of creating additional litigation related to settlement enforcement. For example:

  • Issues may arise if the settlement must be allocated to multiple plaintiffs or amongst various types of damages. Because the statute is silent as to these specific issues, the settling defendant should include all such conditions and terms in the release so as to avoid alleged violations of Section 2301.  

 

  • Issues may arise when the settling defendant or its adjusters have not received all information necessary to issue a settlement draft. For example, a tax identification number and/or a W9, a signed release of any liens, and proper documentation from Medicare regarding any MSA or satisfaction of Medicare’s lien are often requested by the defense as part of settlement. A prudent adjuster or its defense counsel should request such documents early in the settlement process, and well before a settlement is reached. If, while nearing a settlement, the defendant does not believe the plaintiff has submitted all necessary documentation or documentation is insufficient, the plaintiff’s counsel should be advised in writing what documents or information is still required prior to payment. That writing should also advise the plaintiff has not complied with the statute, and the 30-day deadline has not begun to run.

In summary, defendants, their adjusters, and defense attorneys must now pay close attention to deadlines surrounding a settlement’s completion. Any delay in the settlement process, such as a delay in requesting the check or a delay in obtaining the necessary information to request the check, has the potential to put the defendant up against the 30-day deadline.

In plaintiff-friendly Cook, Madison, and St. Clair counties, plaintiffs’ attorneys will be aware of this new statute and we are sure they have told their friends on the bench. We are sure hyper-aggressive plaintiff attorneys in these venues will seek costs and request judgment be entered against you and then immediately initiate collection proceedings.

Of particular note, the statute expressly states it applies to all personal injury, property damage, wrongful death, and tort actions involving a claim for money damages, “except as otherwise agreed by the parties.” We feel this language allows settling defendants and their adjusters to contract around the statute if an agreement can be reached to modify or waive the deadlines set forth in Section 2301. We strongly recommend considering such alternative terms in all settlement negotiations and can offer sample language upon request.

This article was researched and written by Chris St. Peter, J.D. and your editor. Please feel free to provide your thoughts and comments to Chris at cstpeter@keefe-law.com.

 

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Synopsis: Concerns Raised In Federal Ruling About Attorney-Client Privilege When Attorneys are Involved Early in Your Investigation.

 

Editor’s comment: We have a number of top-notch clients who want us, as their defense counsel, to be involved early and often in accident or claims investigation. Their thinking, and we agree with them, is to make some or most of the investigation privileged. As court watchers and legal observers, we want our clients and readers to understand possible changes to this concept.

 

In a recent Federal court decision from Massachusetts, the U.S. Magistrate cast some confusion and/or uncertainty about this concept. In Koss v. Palmer Water Department, et. als., the Federal Court did not uphold the attorney-client privilege, effectively finding the attorneys were involved too much in determining the nature of the claim and forming defenses to allow their work to remain wholly privileged.

 

The ruling demonstrates why employers should give careful consideration to the attorney-client privilege before conducting an investigation in the workplace.?This U.S. Magistrate in Massachusetts held the employer had waived the attorney-client privilege because its outside counsel actively managed another attorney’s investigation of a sexual harassment complaint and had discussions with an outside investigator which directly impacted whether the privilege could be upheld.

 

Koss should serve as a cautionary reminder to employers, risk managers and claims adjusters to consider the boundaries of the attorney-client privilege, at the outset of every claim, when deciding how to best manage the investigation, so as to minimize the risk of having to disclose what you might feel is confidential information. Please note this isn’t an appellate ruling and we don’t know if the concept will gain more traction or acceptance across the country, particularly in WC or personal injury litigation. We still strongly recommend defense counsel be involved as early as possible in important accident and other claims investigations to minimize risk, assist in forming defense, move claims to rapid settlement or closure and best define reserves. The ruling is online at:?http://pacer.mad.uscourts.gov/dc/cgi-bin/recentops.pl?filename=neiman/pdf/koss%2010%2013.pdf.

 

We appreciate your thoughts and comments. Please post them on our award-winning blog.

 

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Synopsis: Correction—we thought we were perfect but we were wrong. New IL WC Arbitrator Jessica Hegarty is not the wife but the daughter of Attorney Terrence K. Hegarty. We sincerely apologize for any confusion this may have caused.