2-8-12; The never-ending debate on the judicially legislated concept of “odd-lot” total and permanent disability rages

The Workers’ Compensation Division of the Illinois Appellate Court dispatched a rare reversal of the Commission despite the seemingly insurmountable “manifest weight of the evidence” standard. In doing so, the Court defined the limits of the “odd-lot” permanent and total disability theory. In Professional Transportation Services v. IWCC (WCC 3472012 IL), the Appellate Court considered an “odd-lot” permanent total disability award issued by the Commission.

Don’t spend a lot of time trying to find the words “odd-lot” in the IL WC Act

Your editors cannot help to point out the term “odd-lot” appears nowhere in the Illinois Statute. This concept of odd-lot total disability is a creation of our Commission and reviewing courts. In our view, it is a classic example of judicial legislation which permits a windfall of benefits to claimants who are clearly employable but find a way to remain unemployed until their payday hits at the Commission.

Please note the vast majority of Illinois state workers adjudicated to be totally and permanently disabled fall into the “odd-lot” category because our State government won’t defend such claims or offer substitute jobs. We are starting to call this phenomenon “odd-State-lot” claims—all of such claims could be ended immediately at a massive savings to Illinois taxpayers if State government leaders would locate alternate work for them and cut off their “double pensions.” Good luck waiting for that to occur.

That said, we are moderately comforted by the Appellate Court’s reversal of the IL WC Commission here, where the claimant clearly had the ability to work at a sedentary level according to his own doctors and an FCE, and where specific jobs were identified for which he was qualified.

This claimant, Mr. Clarke, was a 64 year old van driver assigned to shuttle workers to and from worksites. The slip and fall accident was not disputed and Petitioner had bilateral knee replacement (one replacement was disputed). Upon MMI, there was a sedentary release per an FCE.

A labor market study was performed by David Wolf, a vocational rehabilitation counselor employed by Respondent Professional Transportation. Wolf found, based on FCE restrictions, the claimant could not return to his employment as a van driver for Professional. He concluded the claimant had no "clear" transferable skills. Wolf believed claimant could perform as an entry-level cashier for an employer that would accommodate claimant's restrictions as to standing, walking, climbing, stooping, reaching, and lifting. Wolf concluded his report by stating, based upon the information provided by claimant, "it appears as if [the claimant] is capable of returning to work in a cashier position at an auto dealership." Jobs at dealerships were specifically identified as well.

At trial, the arbitrator awarded 65% loss of the leg and found claimant failed to prove his entitlement to PTD disability benefits either on the basis of medical evidence or on an "odd-lot" The Commission reversed, finding Petitioner permanently and totally disabled under the odd-lot theory.

Odd-lot Standard and “burden shift”

On appeal, our Appellate Court explained an injured employee can establish entitlement to PTD benefits under the IL WC Act in one of three ways, namely: by a preponderance of medical evidence; by showing a diligent but unsuccessful job search; or by demonstrating because of age, training, education, experience, and condition, there are no available jobs for a person in his circumstance, noting "an employee is totally and permanently disabled” when he is unable to make some contribution to the work force sufficient to justify the payment of wages.

The claimant need not, however, be reduced to total physical incapacity before a total permanent disability award may be granted. Rather, our courts rule a person is totally disabled when he/she is incapable of performing services except those for which there is no reasonable stable market. Conversely, an employee is not entitled to total and permanent disability compensation if they are qualified for and capable of obtaining gainful employment without serious risk to health or life.

Once the employee has initially established they fall in what has been termed the "odd-lot" category (one who, though not altogether incapacitated for work, is so handicapped that he will not be employed regularly in any well-known branch of the labor market), then the burden shifts to the employer to show some kind of suitable work is regularly and continuously available to the claimant.

In applying this standard, the Appellate Court correctly pointed out there was no medical evidence which could support a claim of total disability in this case. To the contrary, Drs. Smit, Michalow, Sheinkop, Cohen, and Fletcher each voiced opinions claimant could work, albeit with varying restrictions. As for evidence claimant engaged in a diligent but unsuccessful job search, the Appellate Court called claimant’s effort “meager” and agreed with the arbitrator, who concluded claimant failed to demonstrate he made diligent but unsuccessful attempts to find work. The Court explained that applying for cashier positions at nine auto dealerships and looking in the Sunday newspaper did not constitute a diligent job search.

The Court was then left then with the question of whether the evidence of record can support the Commission's conclusion: “Because of his age, training, education, experience, and physical condition...” claimant was not regularly employable in a well-known branch of the labor market.

In reversing the IL WC Commission, the Court concluded claimant failed to carry his burden in that regard, as he failed to present sufficient evidence he could not find stable employment. Basically, claimant’s job search was insufficient to prove he was unemployable. While we agree with the decision rendered by the Court, we remain alarmed that under slightly different facts, all this claimant would have to do is demonstrate a bit more effort with his job search and he may have perfected his six or seven-figure odd-lot permanent disability award.

We find it incredible a claimant’s entire team of doctors and a vocational expert can all agree a claimant is employable, yet, our IL WC Commission still reserved the right to declare them totally disabled from all work. Based on the legal analysis of the Court, such an award can be based on a valid but unsuccessful job search alone.

Why is this so alarming?

Illinois residents continue to struggle with 10% unemployment and a sluggish economy. There are tens of thousands of able-bodied, educated folks who cannot find work. Their inability to secure a steady job does not make any one of them regularly unemployable. Rather, many of the unemployed are simply victims of this rotten economy. Similarly, the claimant in this case, as in other alleged odd-lot disability claims, is not unemployable at all. He is very employable based upon unanimous medical and vocational expert testimony. Under such circumstances, we believe no claimant should ever be deemed permanently disabled. We know of no other state workers’ compensation system which affords lifetime disability benefits to a claimant who is medically cleared to work by his entire team of doctors. Only in Illinois!

What does this all mean for your biggest wage differential claims? Claim handlers and risk managers must beware of the otherwise employable claimant with permanent restrictions who trudges along with an “unsuccessful” job search for too long. After six or seven months, if no work is secured, aggressive Petitioner’s attorneys will turn your own vocational efforts against you with a claim of “odd lot” disability, simply because the claimant has had no luck finding work. You need to ramp up decision-making and documentation with your voc specialists.

This article was researched and written by John P. Campbell, Jr., J.D. Please feel free to contact John about it at jcampbell@keefe-law.com.

1-30-12; Keep on, Keeping on Dwight Kay—thoughts on stopping/ending our “Plaintiff-attorney-paid-for” judiciary

Last week, State Rep. Dwight Kay, R-Glen Carbon, and State Rep. Paul Evans, R-O'Fallon, filed legislation to require the Illinois Supreme Court to adopt rules requiring judges/justices who receive more than $500 from an attorney or attorney's firm to recuse themselves from that particular case. The legislation also requires attorneys who appear before a judge or justice to disclose all contributions made to the judge/justice by an attorney or attorney's firm.

We are thrilled to hear someone is finally noticing how ostensibly corrupt this is. In our view, every current indication is justice is openly and legally for sale in Illinois and the major buyers are the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association. We suggest adding the same requirement for WC Arbitrators/Commissioner and any other Illinois administrative hearing officers who are running for judicial office. If monies are donated to them, it should be openly disclosed.

We also caution one way around this legislation is to have an attorney donate, for example, $10K to the local or state Democratic party but earmark the money to be relayed to the specific judicial campaign. Another way around this is to host parties or fundraisers to get $499 from fifty lawyers and all of them combine to a pool to donate the money to a soon-to-be-friendly judge or justice. We feel the attorney(s) who host the fundraiser for a judge or justice to raise $25,000 should have to similarly recuse themselves.

1-30-12; Terminating a worker three weeks early in conflict with FMLA costs a U.S. employer over $300,000!

Make sure you communicate your method of calculating Family and Medical Leave Act benefits or you will lose your ability to terminate a worker for violating the policy—and it may cost you plenty. According to the recent ruling by the 6th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Thom vs. American Standard Inc., when a 36-year employee originally asked for FMLA leave from April 27, 2005, until June 27, 2005, for a non-work-related shoulder injury, which the Ohio-based firm approved and then was cleared to return to work earlier on June 13, 2005 and didn’t return but produced a note on June 17, 2005 keeping him off work until June 27. When he was asked on June 14 why he had not returned, he indicated he was still off because of increased pain in his shoulder. He appeared at work June 17 with a doctor's note asking to extend his leave until July 18. He was terminated because the company had counted every day from June 13 as an unexcused absence and he exceeded the absences allowed.

Defendant American Standard, Inc. appealed the District Court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff on his claim American Standard interfered with his rights under 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D) of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) the “interference” claim). American Standard also disputed the District Court's calculation of Thom's damages. Thom cross-appealed on the basis the District Court erred by not granting liquidated damages provided for in his FMLA (the “liquidated damages” claim), which calls for double damages except where the employer acted in “good faith” in discharging the employee.

The District Court awarded Plaintiff Thom $99,960 in attorney fees, $2,732.90 in costs, and $104,354.85 in back pay. The court below further ordered American Standard change Thom's termination date from June 17, 2005 to December 31, 2007, so Thom would be eligible for his expected pension and retiree health benefits for both himself and his spouse. If this change was impossible, the court required American Standard to pay Thom a monthly annuity covering the difference between his expected pension and the pension he actually received because of his early termination (a difference of 36%). The District Court denied the statutory liquidated damages because it found, despite violating the FMLA, American Standard acted both in “good faith” and with reasonable grounds for its actions when it discharged Thom.

The Federal Appeals Court noted Mr. Thom contended the company failed to inform him it used the rolling method for calculating FMLA, and the appeals court agreed. “At no time throughout the FMLA process did the company mention to Thom that his leave time would be governed by a ‘rolling' 12-month period.” It was further noted “The only written document he received from the company stated that his leave would expire on June 27. He was only notified that American Standard had accelerated his return-to-work date on June 14, after it had already lapsed the day before,”. The 6th Circuit panel said it agreed with the District Court “that employers should inform their employees in writing of which method they will use to calculate the FMLA leave year. This standard is consistent with the principles of fairness and general clarity, and applying it, American Standard's notice to Thom fell decidedly short.” Disagreeing with the District Court, the Federal Appeals Court also held Mr. Thom was entitled to the liquidated damages provided for in the FMLA, which calls for double damages.

The FMLA stipulates

·         An eligible employee shall be entitled to a total of 12 work weeks of leave during any 12–month period, because of a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position of such employee.” 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(D).

·         Employers, for their part, are “permitted to choose any one of [four] methods for determining the '12–month period' in which the 12 weeks of leave entitlement occurs.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.200(b).

o   Two of these four methods, namely, the “rolling” method and the “calendar” method, are pertinent to this case.

§  The “rolling” method calculates an employee's leave year “backward from the date an employee uses any FMLA leave.” Id. Using this method, Thom's leave would have expired on June 13.

§  Under the “calendar” method, which renders an employee eligible for 12 weeks of FMLA leave each calendar year, Thom's allowed leave would have extended theoretically through July 14.

American Standard terminated Thom for unexcused absences on June 17. Thus, Thom needs the “calendar” method to apply. At no time throughout the FMLA process did the Company mention to Thom that his leave time would be governed by a “rolling” 12–month period. The only written document he received from the company stated his leave would expire on June 27. He was only notified American Standard accelerated his return-to-work date on June 14, after it had already elapsed the day before. The first time Thom was given actual notice the Company was using a “rolling” method requiring him to return to work on an earlier date was after he filed his lawsuit in this case when the defense lawyers raised the rolling method as a defense.

American Standard contended its Union officers knew the method American Standard historically maintained a policy of applying the “rolling” method and argued their knowledge was imputed to Thom “through simple agency law”. The major problem  with their theory was Plaintiff had already been told his leave would not expire until June 27. Consequently, Thom was entitled to rely on the calendar method and the date of June 27 the company had given in writing. The Federal Appeals Court did not agree and also did not agree with the District Court’s denial of liquidated damages noting the company's after-the-fact reliance on the rolling method—its primary justification in the district court and on appeal—was a pretextual reason never raised in Thom's case before the discharge and only raised by American Standard once the case was in litigation. The June 27 date agreed to in writing by American Standard was completely inconsistent with the rolling method and with defense counsel's reliance on the rolling method as a justification for discharge. Pretextual reasons for discharge manufactured after the fact in order to justify an earlier wrong are not consistent or made in good faith. The rolling calendar pretext was an ostensible motive given after-the-fact as a cover for the real reason for firing this 36–year employee—whatever those economic motives may have been.

Accordingly, the Federal Appeals Court affirmed the judgment of the District Court on the interference claim under 29 U.S.C. § 2612 including damages and reversed the judgment of the District Court on the liquidated damages claim under 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a) and remanded for the doubling of damages in accordance with this opinion. By our calculations, this will result in a total award to be paid by American Standard in excess of $310,000.

Tracking and managing employee leave time is a great challenge given federal and state-mandated leave laws, workers compensation claims and employer-provided leave. Make sure you have a clear policy in place which is provided in writing and then follow your policy. If you become involved in litigation, ensure you have defense counsel who don’t present defenses which double your damages. This article was researched and written by Shawn R. Biery, J. D.; MSCC who can be reached for question or comment at sbiery@keefe-law.com